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DRAWING NEGATIVE INFERENCES UPON A CLAIM
OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE t
Deborah Stavile Bartel*
INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege lies at the foundation of the
American legal system.' One of the oldest privileges recog-
nized by the common law,2 it safeguards the attorney-client
relationship by protecting from disclosure certain communica-
tions between client and lawyer.3 Despite the privilege's roots
in the English common law and the American adversary sys-
tem of justice, confusion still surrounds the evidentiary ramifi-
cations of its assertion. When the attorney-client privilege is
invoked,4 some courts will permit the fact-finder to draw an
adverse inference.5 While the federal rules of evidence take no
t © 1995 Deborah Stavile Bartel. The author dedicates this Article to the late
Honorable James Hunter EIl, Unites States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
a great teacher, a wise judge and my good friend.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Touro Law School. My thanks to Touro
Law students RoseMarie Rotondo and Robert Venture for their research assistance.
My gratitude to Professors Gary Shaw and Bruce Green for their comments and to
Cello Barenholtz, Esq. for her contribution and counsel.
1 A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dis-
missed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
2 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Union Carbide Corp.
v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1046 (D. Del. 1985); 8 WIGIORE ON EvI-
DENCE § 2290, at 542 (Chadbourn rev. 3d ed. 1979).
The attorney-client privilege may be stated as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal
advisor, in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at that instant
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal
advisor (8) except when the protection is waived.
8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2292, at 554.
" Throughout the discussion, this Article assumes that the assertion of the
privilege is valid and it has not been waived.
Generally, an adverse inference is a reasonable deduction made by the fact-
finder drawn from proven facts. Braycovich v. Braycovich, 314 P.2d 767, 771 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1957); see infra notes 106-33 and accompanying text.
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position on this issue,6 some state codes of evidence prohibit a
fact-finder from drawing an adverse inference upon a claim of
privilege but fail to distinguish between the different privi-
leges.' In addition, some courts require the privilege to be in-
voked in the fact-finder's presence while others consider this to
be prejudicial error.'
This lack of uniformity in the treatment of the attorney-
client privilege is troubling. The inconsistent treatment arises
from the failure to determine whether the goals of the privilege
are promoted or impeded by allowing an adverse inference.
Further compounding the problem, some courts and legislators
confuse claims of attorney-client privilege with the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' As a result,
some jurisdictions have imposed evidentiary consequences,
appropriate in the fifth amendment context, to claims made
under the attorney-client privilege."
Some state evidence codes that forbid an inference were
conceived at a time when the fifth amendment privilege was
believed to forbid all negative inferences upon its exercise."
Subsequent case law developments, however, curtailed the fifth
amendment privilege's protection from adverse inference. To-
day, a claim of fifth amendment privilege permits a negative
inference in civil proceedings, 2 and indeed some commenta-
tors argue that the inference is necessary." Some even be-
lieve that an adverse inference should be permitted in a crimi-
See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence ("FEE") 513 also known as Supreme
Court Standard 513, would disallow any negative inference from the assertion of
any privilege. The Advisory Committee borrowed this prohibition from the fiffth
amendment context, relying on Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Approxi-
mately 30 states have adopted some version of proposed FRE 513. See infra notes
174-90 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 115-23 & 180-81 and accompanying text.
See FED. R. EVID. Advisory Comm. Note to Proposed Rule 513; see also VT.
R. EVID. 512 reporter's notes at 375 ("If a privilege is important enough to protect,
the policy of protection should not be undermined by putting a price on the exer-
cise of the privilege."); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76, at 155-56 (Edward W.
Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
" See infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text.
" Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611.
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 335 (1976); Brink's Inc. v. City of New
York, 717 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1983).
' Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil
Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1088 (1982).
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nal case when the fifth amendment privilege is asserted. 4 To
the extent the rule applied to the attorney-client privilege
follows the rule applied to the fifth amendment, these develop-
ments in fifth amendment law erode the protection of the at-
torney-client privilege from negative inference. In response to
this decline in fifth amendment protection, legislators have
amended two state evidence codes to permit an adverse infer-
ence from any claim of privilege-including the attorney-client
privilege-in civil proceedings. 5
This trend is problematic. The fifth amendment analogy
should not be used; it should not jeopardize the protection from
inference afforded the attorney-client privilege. The fifth
amendment analogy fails adequately to protect the attorney-
client relationship. A negative inference decreases the protec-
tion of the attorney-client privilege and undermines its efficacy
in encouraging communications. The civil/criminal dichotomy,
useful in the fifth amendment context, makes no sense for the
attorney-client privilege. An adverse inference thwarts the pur-
poses underlying the attorney-client privilege regardless of
whether the case is civil or criminal in nature. The evidentiary
fate of the attorney-client privilege must be severed from that
of the fifth amendment privilege to guard against improper
negative inferences. 6 This separation is proper because their
theoretical underpinnings and policies differ. Just as the ap-
propriate scope of a privilege is best determined by reference to
its underlying purposes, the appropriate evidentiary conse-
quences of a claim of privilege ought to be decided with refer-
ence to its purposes.'
This Article explores the appropriateness of permitting a
negative inference upon a valid claim of the attorney-client
privilege. Part I traces the historical origins and the policy
justifications for the attorney-client privilege. After examining
" OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM SILENCE: TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
PORT No. 8 (1989) [hereinafter REPORT TO ATORNEY GENERAL].
, See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
IG See, e.g., Phillips v. Chase, 87 N.E. 755, 758 (Mass. 1909) (allowing adverse
inference on assertion of attorney-client privilege because it is the rule when the
self-incrimination privilege is invoked).
17 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v. El
Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984).
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utilitarian, non-utilitarian and full utilitarian justifications,
this section concludes that each continues to present sound
theoretical bases for the attorney-client privilege.18 Next, Part
II explores the origins and purposes of the fifth amendment
privilege, contrasting its scope with the attorney-client privi-
lege. Part III then examines the conflicting status of current
case law as it applies to the permissibility of adverse inferenc-
es when the attorney-client privilege is invoked. Part IV con-
siders the differing legislative approaches to the permissibility
of a negative inference on a claim of privilege. Part V explores
the relationship between inferences and a claim of privilege,
including distinguishing the attorney-client privilege from the
fifth amendment privilege and discussing the inappropriate-
ness of an analogy between a claim of privilege and the miss-
ing witness doctrine. Finally, Part VI discusses how an infer-
ence undermines the policies of the attorney-client privilege
and proposes a draft rule of evidence to prohibit such inference
except when the interests of justice require in a criminal case.
Ultimately, this Article demonstrates that because negative
inferences are inconsistent with the attorney-client privilege's
justifications, they should be prohibited.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Privileges-rules of evidence that give parties the right to
withhold relevant information during litigation-exist despite
the legal system's general goal of truth seeking. By their very
nature privileges stop the flow of information, thereby denying
the public's right to "every man's evidence."19 Privileges exist
to advance extrinsic societal values irrelevant to the lawsuit.
The scope of a privilege appropriately extends therefore only as
far as its policy reasons dictate."
Indisputably, the attorney-client privilege works to fore-
' See Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1504 (1985).
8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2192, at 70; The Supreme Court has often reit-
erated this maxim. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974);
Branzburg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932).
" Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (holding that the spousal
privilege permitting one spouse to stop the other from testifying had no support in
contemporary society and, thus, constricted the privilege.)
[Vol. 60: 1355
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close the discovery of some information, namely the statements
between client and lawyer.2 But the attorney-client privilege
does not bar testimony about the underlying facts in the dis-
pute. The client can still be questioned about the facts giving
rise to the matter under legal consultation. Only the substance
of what the client and lawyer discussed is shielded. This typi-
cally results in a significantly smaller sphere of withheld infor-
mation than the privilege against self-incrimination where
access to the underlying facts in dispute is foreclosed if the
person from whom the information is sought would be exposing
herself to potential criminal liability by responding to the re-
quest for information.' Commentators occasionally have ad-
vocated abolition of the attorney-client privilege, arguing it has
outgrown its usefulness in civil cases.' Critics also have as-
serted that the privilege should be strictly construed because it
is a self-generated privilege, created by lawyers, designed to
protect communications to lawyers.24
Abolition of the privilege is an unlikely prospect. Courts
and lawyers agree the attorney-client privilege is useful and
necessary for navigating through a complex system of laws and
court proceedings. Although the privilege itself may not be
abolished outright, decreasing the scope of its protection by
allowing an adverse inference creates the risk of shrinking the
effective protection of the privilege. Clients need to consult
with lawyers to avoid legal problems, not necessarily in
reaction to existing legal problems. To encourage greater public
conformity to complex regulated areas of the law, it is impor-
tant to encourage legal consultations, not to burden consul-
tations between client and lawyer with a penalty for a subse-
quent failure to waive the privilege. Lawyer consultations will
be effective only if the client can openly and candidly discuss
the matter at hand. Fear of having to waive the privilege or
suffer an adverse inference will hinder the openness of the
client's communications, rendering the legal advice ineffective
21 See generally 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 2290-2329.
See infra part HI for a fuller discussion of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and how it operates.
' See, e.g., Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 27
(1942).
2 Daniel Capra, Address at the New York State Bar Association Seminar on
New York and Federal Evidence (Oct. 7, 1993).
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or meaningless. The modern social justifications for the attor-
ney-client privilege are ample. They are also distinct from the
privilege's historical foundations, to the extent those roots can
be traced at all.
A. History of the Privilege
Apart from fragments of decisions dating to the Elizabe-
than period, the first reported decisions involving the attorney-
client privilege in England occurred in 1654. In the next ninety
years a total of fourteen reported cases involving the attorney-
client privilege were reported.' American cases did not ap-
pear until the 1820s and then were ambiguous on the scope of
the attorney-client privilege. 6 American courts generally were
reluctant to recognize the privilege, allowing it to evolve slowly
and with a number of exceptions concerning criminal acts or
wrongdoing. 7
Scholars disagree over the initial rationale for protecting
attorney-client communications from disclosure.S Some posit
that the privilege first may have been conceived as a logical
outgrowth of the privilege against self-incrimination.29 Ameri-
can law contains some very limited historical support for this
view. For example, at least in criminal cases, some courts have
recognized an "incrimination rationale" for the attorney-client
privilege ° and used this rationale as an analytical tool to de-
termine the scope of the privilege. The extent of material pro-
tected from disclosure was determined by assessing whether
the information sought from the attorney would incriminate
the client.3' The incrimination rationale as a theoretical foun-
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978).
26 Id. at 1087 & n.120, 1089.
27 Id.
See Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1502.
See Rochester City Bank v. Suydam Sage & Co., 5 How. Pr. 254, 258-59
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851); 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
201-03 (1926); 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370. To the extent the
attorney-client privilege is thought to have a constitutional foundation in American
law, the privilege is thought to be grounded in the sixth amendment right to
counsel, not the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. See infra note 50
and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
21 See, e.g., Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960) (shielding
1360 [Vol. 60: 1355
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRMLEGE
dation for the attorney-client privilege is no longer recognized
in any jurisdiction.32 To the extent the attorney-client privi-
lege is thought to have a constitutional basis in current Ameri-
can law, it appears to be grounded in the sixth amendment
right to counsel-not in the fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination. 3
A second possible origin for the privilege, one favored by
Wigmore, is rooted in English notions of honor.34 The code of
honor among "gentlemen lawyers" was thought to forbid an
attorney from divulging any matter spoken in confidence.35
Compelled disclosure was thought to compromise the gentle-
man lawyer's honor." Clearly such a rationale is an inade-
quate justification for employing the privilege in today's legal
climate.37
client's identity under the attorney-client privilege where attorney made payments
to IRS on anonymous client's behalf because this information "may well be the
link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime"); accord United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975).
' See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 742 F.2d 61, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1984). Compare
In re Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 492-94
(7th Cir. 1984) with In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982).
See also In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied sub noma., Durant v. United States, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); Phaksuan v.
United States, 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983) (information regarding the fee ar-
rangement not privileged "even though it may evidence wrongdoing by the client");
In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir.), vacated sub nom., In
re Harvey, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Baird, 279 F.2d at 635; JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS IN EVIDENCE 1451
(8th ed. 1988).
z' See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 528-31; Hazard, supra note 25, at
1070; Morgan, supra note 23, at 25; Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at
1502. In general, Professor Hazard takes issue with Dean Wigmore's claim that
the attorney-client privilege was transplanted to the United States without contro-
versy. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 1087 n.120.
6 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2286, at 530-31. A similar notion of loyalty to
the client appears to have supported the Roman attorney-client privilege. See Max
Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communications Between Lawyer and Client,
16 CAL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1928).
Whether these reasons or others originally gave rise to the development of
the privilege is far from clear. See Hazard, supra note 25, at 1070 (tracing the
ambiguity in the privilege's origins and refuting the attempts of other scholars,
including Wigmore, to identify the original reasons for the creation of the privi-
lege).
" Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Trials 355 (1776). The "honor of
lawyers" rationale may not be totally irrelevant as a justification for the privilege.
Modern emphasis on a lawyer's avoidance of even the appearance of impropriety,
19951
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Initially, the privilege operated in a manner that allowed
only the attorney the right to assert the privilege and denied
the client the privilege." In time, courts recognized the use-
fulness of designating the client the privilege holder and the
decision whether to waive or assert the privilege became the
client's alone. 9
B. The Privilege's Purposes
Whatever the precise origins of the privilege, moral con-
cerns, not practical ones, originally justified the attorney-client
privilege. These early justifications were in the nature of
rights: the right of the client against indirect self-incrimination
and the right of the lawyer not to compromise his integrity or
honor. The early rationales of the privilege stemmed from the
"belief that disclosure is intrinsically wrong."" This type of
justification-concerned solely with the rights advanced by the
privilege rather than with its social utility-is referred to as
"non-utilitarian."4'
Early pragmatic justifications known as "utilitarian" justi-
fications also supported the privilege and existed simulta-
neously with the non-utilitarian justifications. Early utilitarian
justifications for the privilege included providing "subjectively
for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal
adviser,"" facilitating the client's ability to conduct litigation
of complex issues,43 allowing an open exchange of communica-
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (1990), would seem to
militate against permitting or requiring a lawyer to give testimony against his
client which arises from the confidential communication of the client protected by
law. For a lawyer to testify against one who has sought his guidance and experi-
ence appears arguably to be improper without some social justification. For exam-
ple, protecting the public against ongoing or future crime or fraud allows a lawyer
to disclose a client's confidence and such disclosure appears to be "proper." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 (1982).
Morgan, supra note 23, at 25.
" Morgan, supra note 23, at 25; see also King v. Barrett, 11 Ohio St. 261, 263
(1860).
' Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1502.
41 Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1502.
' 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543.
' See Hatton v. Robinson, 31 Mass. (14 Pick) 416, 422 (1833); Anderson v.
Bank of British Columbia, 2 Ch. D. 644, 649 (1876); Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea,
17 How. St. Tr. 1139, 1223 (Ex. 1743); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2290, at 543
(citing HOLDSWORTH, supra note 29, at 202).
1362 [Vol. 60: 1355
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tions between client and legal advisor, and, perhaps most im-
portantly, promoting more effective advocacy by lawyers."
Modern justifications for the attorney-client privilege still
may be categorized as non-utilitarian (rights-based) or utilitar-
ian (pragmatic). Rights-based rationales continue to flourish as
theorists justify the privilege as the "right of every person to
freely and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of
the law,"45 as a protection of the right of privacy46 and as a
promotion of the right of individual independence and autono-
my within the confining framework of a given system of
laws.47 Other theorists justify the attorney-client privilege by
espousing its constitutional roots in the guarantees of the right
to counsel and the right against compelled self-incrimina-
tion.48 Non-utilitarians also maintain that the attorney-client
privilege is "grounded in a policy entirely extrinsic to the fact-
finding process: its purpose is to foster a confidence between
client and attorney that will lead to a trusting and open dia-
See Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1503.
'5 Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960) (the right to confer with
skilled knowledgeable counsel to assure adequate advice and a proper defense); cf
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981) ("A client must feel
free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally
free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client.").
' James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 ViaL.
L. REV. 279, 316-38 (1963); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial
Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEO.
L.J. 613, 652 (1976); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61,
85-94 (1973) (discussing testimonial privileges and the right of privacy and
speech); David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101 (1956); Privileged Communications,
supra note 18, at 1504.
'" Clute v. Davenport Co., 118 F.R.D. 312, 314 (D. Conn. 1988); see also Ste-
phen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA.
L. REV. 597, 605-06 (1980) (describing the importance of evidentiary privileges for
confidential communications used by both lawyers and psychiatrists).
's Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (government intru-
sion into criminal defendant's attorney-client relationship violated sixth amendment
right), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952); Hazard, supra note 25, at 1062 (privilege
necessary to protect right to counsel and right against self-incrimination); Com-
ment, Extending The Attorney-Client Privilege: A Constitutional Mandate, 13 PAC.
L.J. 437, 441-42 (1982); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity,
97 YALE L.J. 1725, 1730 (1988). But see Beckler v. Superior Court, 568 F.2d 661
(9th Cir. 1978); Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1951),
aff'd, 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied., 351 U.S. 972 (1956); Saltzburg, supra
note 47, at 603 n.14.
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logue between them."49 To these theorists, the client's need
for this confidential dialogue in and of itself is sufficiently
important to justify the privilege regardless of whether the dia-
logue promotes other benefits to society.
Despite ample support for the existence of the privilege
based on non-utilitarian justifications, the utilitarian theoreti-
cal foundation is the favored justification for sheltering attor-
ney-client confidences." Wigmore formulated the classic utili-
tarian balancing test to justify preserving the confidentiality of
client communications to lawyers: the injury to the attorney-
client relationship by the disclosure of the communication
must be greater than the benefit that would be gained thereby
for the correct disposal of the litigation.51 Utilitarians main-
tain the attorney-client privilege exists to protect a relation-
ship that is a mainstay of our system of justice: lawyer and
client.52 The privilege is vital to encouraging full and frank
communication between clients and legal advisors53 and to
promoting the efficient administration of justice. 4
' Commonwealth v. Sims, 521 A.2d 391, 394 (Pa. 1987); see also 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 2, § 2196, at 111; id. § 2291, at 545; id. § 2324, at 631.
See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-04 (5th Cir. 1970); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, §
2285, at 527; Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1502-04; Note, supra
note 48, at 1729-31.
6' 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2285, at 527.
52 Clute v. Davenport Co., 118 F.R.D. 312, 314 (D. Conn. 1988); see Saltzburg,
supra note 47, at 605-06 (describing a lawyer's importance in the operation of our
legal system).
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 385; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888); Note, supra note 48, at 1729.
"4 Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 73 N.Y.2d 588, 592, 540 N.E.2d 703,
705, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (1989) (the attorney-client privilege is designed to fos-
ter "uninhibited dialogue between lawyers and clients in their professional engage-
ments, thereby ultimately promoting the administration of justice"). As one com-
mentator has summarized the policies of the attorney-client privilege:
The purposes and necessities of the relation between a client and his
attorney require, in many cases, on the part of the client, the fullest and
freest disclosures to the attorney of the client's objects, motives and acts.
This disclosure is made in the strictest confidence, relying upon the
attorney's honor and fidelity. To permit the attorney to reveal to others
what is so disclosed, would be not only a gross violation of a sacred
trust upon his part, but it would utterly destroy the usefulness and bene-
fits to be derived from professional assistance. Based upon considerations
of public policy, therefore, the law wisely declares that all confidential
communications and disclosures made by a client to his legal advisor for
1364 [Vol. 60: 1355
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Utilitarians also justify the attorney-client privilege by
arguing that it contributes to the fact-finding process of our
adversarial system. The privilege encourages a client to reveal
more relevant facts to his lawyer so that the lawyer is better
able to develop a fuller factual record on behalf of the client.
This factual development improves the accuracy of the fact-
finding process. Utilitarians rationalize the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications because it is deemed essential
to the lawyer's performance of her role as advocate. Unless the
client is free to disclose everything, good as well as bad, the
lawyer cannot be properly prepared to defend or promote the
client's case.55 If the lawyer is able to prepare properly she
will make better decisions about whether to maintain a case,
assert a particular defense, or settle the case. The privilege,
therefore, helps ease courts' burden in managing cases.56
Outside of the litigation context the attorney-client privi-
lege is considered to be critical to the effectiveness of the
lawyer's role as advisor. Without the confidentiality insured by
the privilege it is feared the client will not disclose trouble-
some facts. As a result, the lawyer's advice will be either inad-
equate, useless or misleading.57 Utilitarians, therefore, justify
the attorney-client privilege on the ground that "encouraging
clients to make the fullest disclosure to their attorneys enables
the latter to act more effectively, justly and expeditiously, and
that these benefits outweigh"" any costs resulting from the
loss of relevant facts in court.59 Modern utilitarian supporters
the purpose of obtaining professional aid or advice, shall be strictly privi-
leged; that the attorney shall not be permitted without the consent of his
client, and much less will he be compelled to reveal or disclose commu-
nications made to him under such circumstances.
2 FLOYD R. MECHEM, MECHEM ON AGENCY § 3397, at 1877 (2d ed. 1914).
Hazard, supra note 25, at 1061.
See Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1506-07, 1515 & 1517.
" Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1506-17; see also Morgan, su-
pra note 23, at 26. On the other hand, Morgan was not concerned in the least
that bad advice or inadequately prepared litigation would follow from a client's
suppressing unfavorable facts from his lawyer if no privilege protected the commu-
nications. Morgan asked: "Whom has he to blame but himself? Why should he be
saved from his own deceit?". Morgan, supra note 23, at 26.
' Doe v. United States, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting 2 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, EVIDENCE, % 503[02], at 503-16 (8th ed.
1988)).
" See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
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of the privilege continue to argue, as did Wigmore, that the
privilege should apply only when the benefits of confidentiality
outweigh the benefits of disclosure."°
In addition to the non-utilitarian and utilitarian justifica-
tions for the attorney-client privilege, a third theoretical frame-
work has been suggested to justify the privilege. Described as
"full utilitarianism," this theory incorporates the traditional
concerns of non-utilitarians into "a broad utilitarian frame-
work."6' Full utilitarians recognize that the privilege benefits
individuals by facilitating rights such as the right to privacy,
"o See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitu-
tional Entitlement, 91 HARV. L. REV. 464, 465 (1977); Privileged Communications,
supra note 18, at 1501. Professor Saltzburg criticizes Wigmore's balancing test for
erroneously imagining a loss of information. Professor Saltzburg argues that the
privilege itself creates the disclosure of information. Therefore, he argues, if the
protection is eliminated the disclosure will cease to exist. The privilege, Professor
Saltzburg asserts, does not deprive fact-finders of any information that would exist
in the absence of the attorney-client privilege. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Communica-
tions Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IoWA L. REV. 811, 817-18
(1981); Saltzburg, supra note 47, at 609-11; accord Commission on Professional
Responsibility, Roscoe Pound American Trial Lawyer's Foundation, Rule I cmt.
(Discussion Draft 1980).
Because Wigmore's balancing test assumes a loss of information, it can be
criticized on an additional ground. Since the client can always be questioned on
the underlying facts of the dispute, in effect, no information relevant to the dis-
puted facts is kept from the fact-finder. This is especially so where the client is
consistent, i.e., where the client told the truth to his lawyer and testifies truthful-
ly about the underlying facts at trial or told lies to his lawyer and holds to that
same story at trial. In each case, the information to be gleaned from disclosure of
the communication between attorney and client is merely cumulative and corrobo-
rative of information already available to the fact-finder.
The only time "information" is lost is where the client tells one version of
events to his lawyer and another to the fact-finder. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986) (client changed story to strengthen defense of self-defense). In
Whiteside, the lawyer's threat to reveal the client's perjury if the client offered
perjured testimony was held to not violate the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment nor to compromise the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 174. This
turn of events is the rare exception, not the rule. In practice, clients infrequently
tell their lawyer one thing and then testify to another. Clients are usually more
consistent, perhaps only telling so much of the truth as the client wishes, but
usually not changing details because to do so is evidence of the client's original
mistrust of the lawyer. The attorney-client privilege, therefore, does not, result in
a loss of information to the fact-finder or, to the extent it does, it is an infrequent
occurrence. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("Application of
the attorney-client privilege . . . puts the adversary in no worse position than if
the communication had never taken place.").
" Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1505 & nn.27-29; see also id.
at 1504-09.
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the right to professional legal advice to address the law's com-
plexity, and the right to be secure in the "expectations essen-
tial to making and carrying out life's plans."62 Full utilitarian-
ism also takes into account the social good achieved by privi-
leged counseling, which promotes client conformity to the law
and in turn produces the further benefits of reduced litigation
and fewer social wrongs. 3 This full utilitarianism approach
therefore advocates a broad privilege that would exempt from
protection only those communications that further on-going or
future crime or fraud. 4
Present justifications for the privilege are numerous. It
would be exceedingly difficult for businesses and persons alike
to conform to the vast body of law and regulations that govern
their conduct without the legal guidance emphasized by full-
utilitarians. Furthermore, the privilege benefits not only indi-
vidual clients but also significantly contributes to the efficiency
of our litigation system. Our court system could not function
without lawyers who, aided by the privilege, weed out inade-
quate claims, eliminate flimsy defenses and satisfactorily settle
the great majority of civil disputes. Similarly, in the criminal
setting, the majority of persons accused of criminal wrongdoing
could not present a winning trial defense or strike a fair plea
bargain without lawyers with whom they felt secure in fully
disclosing information. The privilege is clearly desirable and
justified by the important rights it facilitates for clients and
the benefits it provides to society.
II. ORIGINS OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
The origins and purposes of the privilege against self-in-
crimination differ from those of the attorney-client privilege.
The contrast between the two privileges suggests that they
need not be treated identically as some legislators and courts
' Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1517 ("a layman worried about
incrimination might be reluctant not only to relate all relevant information to an
attorney, but also to seek the aid of an attorney in the first place.... [A] full
utilitarian perspective . . . leads to a privilege that is well-tailored to the purpose
of inducing laymen to seek legal assistance); see also id. at 1506-07 & 1515; Doe
v. United States, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
See Privileged Communications, supra note 18, at 1517.




Although the English common law privilege and the Amer-
ican constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion have existed for quite some time, neither may have origi-
nated as early as commonly is thought.65 Dean Wigmore dates
the English recognition of the privilege to the second half of
the seventeenth century.6  Professor Langbein, however,
marks it considerably later, contending that until the late eigh-
teenth century, persons suspected of crime in England were
the principal evidentiary resource of pretrial criminal investi-
gation. Langbein further contends that the structure of the
English common law criminal trial was inconsistent with the
notion that an accused person had the right to remain si-
lent.67 Langbein describes the criminal trial model before the
late eighteenth century as one in which a defendant not only
was denied counsel in almost all felony cases but also lacked
the presumption of innocence and faced a prosecutor who bore
either a poorly defined burden of proof or no burden at all.
During this era, the criminal defendant's only practical defense
was to answer the evidence and charges in his own words."
To remain silent where a defendant had no counsel to speak
for him, where the defendant lacked the presumption of inno-
cence, and where the prosecution did not bear a burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was a sure road to conviction.
The forces of the English trial process were inconsistent with a
right to remain silent until the modern adversarial process
developed.
The reasons for the development of the privilege against
self-incrimination also may differ from what the accepted wis-
" See John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination at Common Law, 92 MIcH. L. REV. 1047 (1994); Eben Moglen, Taking
the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086, 1087-90 (1994).
" Wigmore contends the privilege was broadly accepted by the 1660s. 8
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2250, at 289-90 n.105; see also John H. Wigmore, The
Privilege Against Self-incrimination: Its History, 15 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1902); John
H. Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Podere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1891).
Langbein, supra note 65, at 1056-57.
Langbein, supra note 65, at 1057. With the development of representation by
counsel in felony cases by the late eighteenth century, the criminal defense bar
developed and changed a criminal trial from one in which the accused spoke to
one that tested the prosecution's evidence without the defendant answering the
charges. Id. at 1066-71.
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dom has taught. Older scholars, such as Dean Wigmore, assert
that the privilege arose in reaction to centuries of torture,
tyranny and persecution at the hands of the ecclesiastical
courts and the prerogative courts of the Star Chamber and the
High Commission.69 These courts administered ex officio oaths
requiring persons under investigation to answer truthfully
questions put to them by the court during the pretrial investi-
gation."0 The consequences of refusing to swear the oath or
answer questions were dire: imprisonment or torture."' The
received wisdom has been that these practices spawned the
privilege against self-incrimination, allowing the defendant the
right to stand silent when facing her accusers whether before
or during the trial.
Recently, however, some legal historians have begun to
posit that although Americans and Englishmen understood the
common law to prohibit the use of torture to extract informa-
tion from criminal suspects and, on occasion, to prohibit the
compulsion of an oath, early American courts routinely ques-
tioned suspects and criminal defendants and used those state-
ments against them. This practice continued well after the
enactment of the Fifth Amendment.72 The Fifth Amendment,
Professor Moglen contends, was not intended to discontinue
the English common law practice of routinely questioning crim-
inal suspects and defendants and employing those statements
69 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2250, at 278-82; see also 2 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAmTAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 541-44 (2d ed.
1968) (1895); Leslie H. Dills, The Permissibility of Comment on the Defendant's
Failure to Testify in His Own Behalf in Criminal Proceedings, 3 WASH. L. REV.
161, 162 (1928).
70 Langbein, supra note 65, at 1073.
7' Langbein, supra note 65, at 1073; Dills, supra note 69.
When a person was brought before the Court of High Commission or
Star Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was asked of
him, and subjected to far-reaching and deeply probing inquiry in an ef-
fort to ferret out some unknown and frequently unsuspected crime. He
declined to answer on pain of incarceration, banishment or mutilation.
And if he spoke falsely, he was subject to further punishment. Faced
with this formidable array of alternatives, his decision to speak was
unquestionably coerced. These were the lurid realities which lay behind
enactment of the Fifth Amendment.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see also Henry J. Friendly,
The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN.
L. REV. 671, 686-87 (1968); Heidt, supra note 13, at 1083.
72 Moglen, supra note 65, at 1129.
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against them. Professor Moglen asserts that the presence of
American defense counsel in the nineteenth century, with their
legal strategy and reinterpretation of the language of the Fifth
Amendment, lead to the development of the criminally
accused's right to remain silent. According to Professor Moglen,
the criminal defense bar was responsible for shaping the con-
cept of the privilege against self-incrimination to include the
accused's right to stand silent in the face of evidence. The right
to remain silent was a tactical procedure promulgated by the
defense bar, not an inherited, immutable common-law right of
Englishmen passed along to Americans in the form of the Fifth
Amendment. 3
Professor Langbein similarly argues that the privilege
against self-incrimination in England arose not in reaction to
the earlier excesses of coercion in the forms of oaths and tor-
ture, but because of the trial strategy of defense counsel in the
late eighteenth century. 4 Before the defense bar developed,
Professor Langbein contends, there was no thought that the
suspect or defendant had a right to remain silent. "Indeed, 'the
assumption was clear that if the case against him was false,
the prisoner ought to say so and suggest why, and that if he
did not speak that could only be because he was unable to
deny the truth of the evidence."'75 The privilege against self-
incrimination, embodied in the phrase "Nemo tenetur seipsum
podere," originally did not include a right to remain free from
the negative inference that the suspect was silent because he
had nothing to say to dispute the evidence."6
Today the Supreme Court has enumerated numerous poli-
cies that support the fifth amendment privilege, including:
our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal jus-
tice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by
inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play, which dic-
tates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
7' Moglen, supra note 65, at 1130.
Langbein, supra note 65, at 1047.
7 Langbein, supra note 65, at 1066 (quoting J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE
COURTS IN ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 348-49 (1986))..
76 Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55; see also Friendly, supra note 71, at 686-
87 (1968); Heidt, supra note 13, at 1083.
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leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individ-
ual to shoulder the entire [burden of proof]"; our respect for the
inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each indi-
vidual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life;" our
distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the
privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a pro-
tection for the innocent."
The privilege against self-incrimination ultimately seeks to
"protect the individual from oppression at the hands of a state
exercising its awesome powers of investigation to ferret out
wrongdoing." 8 The modern privilege encompasses not just the
right to refuse to answer, but the right to refuse even to be
questioned. A custodial suspect in the United States has the
power to determine whether an interrogation session will pro-
ceed or end. 9
In contrast to the origins of the attorney-client privilege,
the privilege against self-incrimination did not arise to encour-
age a socially esteemed relationship between two people.8 " In
fact, the privilege has nothing to do with protecting any inter-
personal relationship. Rather, it grows out of concern for the
moral and physical integrity of persons accused of criminal
misconduct, relieving them of the necessity of proving their
innocence.
As a result of the different purposes of the attorney-client
and self-incrimination privileges, they are quite different in
scope. For example, the attorney-client privilege may be
waived only by the client as privilege holder.8' In contrast,
7' Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
" Marine Midland Bank v. John E. Russo Produce Co., 50 N.Y.2d 31, 42, 405
N.E.2d 205, 211, 427 N.Y.S.2d 961, 967 (1980).
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966); Michigan v. Mosley 423
U.S. 96, 100 (1975).
' In addition to the attorney-client privilege, certain privileges arose to protect
relationships society seeks to protect and encourage, such as the spousal privilege,
e.g., FED. R. EMID. 505(a), the physician-patient privilege, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE
990-903 (1966), and the priest-penitent privilege, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 504(a)(1). Oth-
er privileges, however, grow out of the recognition of other socially important val-
ues, for example, the state's secret privilege, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 509, the
government's informant privilege, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 510, or the trade-secrets priv-
ilege, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 508.
" Those matters that a lawyer may disclose, a client's future or ongoing crime
or fraud, are outside the definition of communications protected by the attorney-
client privilege. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR. 4-101(c); see
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there are many ways to surmount a claim of fifth amendment
privilege.82 For example, the fifth amendment privilege can be
challenged on the ground that the response sought will not
incriminate83 or by asserting that a criminal prosecution is
barred by the statute of limitations,84 by double jeopardy,85
or past grants of immunity." The narrowed application of
fifth amendment protection developed strictly as a result of
judicial identification and interpretation of the policies of the
privilege. No similar narrowing attacks have or ought to suc-
ceed with respect to the attorney-client privilege.
An additional distinction between the attorney-client and
self-incrimination privileges is that the former exists where the
information would not incriminate. Unlike the privilege
against self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege applies
whether the information communicated to the lawyer would
exonerate the claimant from liability or is irrelevant; where
criminal and civil prosecution are time barred; where any
other theory, such as collateral estoppel, res judicata, ratifica-
tion, settlement and accord, or release protect the privilege
holder from liability. Furthermore, whereas death terminates
the privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney-client
privilege survives death."
The attorney-client privilege is believed by some to ad-
vance the development of facts in a way that the privilege
against self-incrimination cannot. Because the attorney-client
privilege encourages frank disclosure to one's lawyer, ultimate-
ly it may serve the truth-seeking process of litigation. This
cannot be said of the fifth amendment right to remain silent,
which operates in disregard of the search for the truth. The
privilege against self-incrimination is justified as striking a
fair balance between state and individual, requiring the state
to shoulder the entire burden of proof before anyone suffers a
also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 168 (1986). Thus, disclosure of those matters
are not attacks on the attorney-client privilege. See generally, Note, The Client-
Fraud Dilemma: Need for Consensus, 46 MD. L. REV. 436 (1987); Privileged Com-
munications, supra note 18, at 1509.
Heidt, supra note 13, at 1071-75.
Heidt, supra note 13, at 1071-80.
Heidt, supra note 13, at 1078-80.
Heidt, supra note 13, at 1075-78.
Heidt, supra note 13, at 1080.
See, e.g., Philips v. Chase, 87 N.E. 755 (Mass. 1909).
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criminal conviction.
Another distinction is that since the client can be ques-
tioned about communications shielded by the attorney-client
privilege, it does not bury the underlying facts. The bar only
forecloses making the client or lawyer state what was disclosed
to the lawyer. This is not true of the fifth amendment privi-
lege, which shields compelled disclosure of the underlying facts
from the mouth of the accused, even where the fact-finder has
no other access to those facts. Finally, only natural persons
have a privilege against self-incrimination," while collective
entities and corporations can assert an attorney-client privi-
lege.8
9
These distinctions in how the two privileges operate are a
result of judicial recognition that the policies of the two privi-
leges are different and, therefore, different scopes of protection
are required to effectuate them. The fact that the self-incrimi-
nation privilege has been elevated to constitutional dimension
while the attorney-client privilege is of common-law origin is
irrelevant to a determination of the ambit of their protection.
The privileges' policies, not their source of creation, ought to
determine the ambit of their protections."
To determine whether the consequences of the fifth
amendment privilege are inconsistent with its purposes, the
Supreme Court has examined the impact on the policies of the
privilege. In McGautha v. California, for instance, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a unitary trial procedure in
which the defendant's guilt and sentence were determined in a
single proceeding.91 A defendant asserting his right to remain
silent at such a trial necessarily gave up any chance to testify
for a lenient sentence. Assessing the constitutional permissibil-
ity of attaching such a consequence to an assertion of the privi-
lege, Justice Harlan asked "whether compelling the election
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 120 (1988).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971). To answer the ques-
tion whether to permit an adverse inference from the claim of privilege, one must
not saddle the attorney-client privilege with the rules applicable to the Fifth
Amendment. When one examines the underlying policies of the attorney-client
privilege, it becomes clear that no adverse inference should be permitted when a
party claims the attorney-client privilege. See Waterfront Conm'n, 378 U.S. at 55.
91 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971).
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impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the
rights involved."92 The Court upheld the procedure because
Justice Harlan found that permitting the adverse consequences
that followed was not "compulsion of the sort forbidden by the
privilege [against self-incrimination]."" Therefore, the policies
behind the privilege were found not to have been significantly
impaired.
The Court also has upheld jury instructions permitting an
inference of guilty knowledge from a defendant's failure to
explain his possession of stolen property.94 This inference was
considered consistent with the defendant's right to remain
silent because if there is any pressure to testify, it comes from
the force of the evidence and not from unconstitutional compul-
sion." Thus, the privilege's policies were not significantly im-
peded. Similarly, the rationale behind permitting adverse in-
ferences upon assertions of the right to remain silent in civil
cases is based on the notion that attaching such consequences
is not a "compulsion" forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.96
Attaching penalties that do not amount to compulsion do not
92 Id.
Id.; see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-85 (1970).
" See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973); Turner v.
United States 396 U.S. 398, 417-18 n.35 (1970).
"5 See Donald B. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from
Silence: Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841 (1980).
"' See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The Court upheld the per-
missibility of a negative inference in a prison disciplinary proceeding upon claim of
the privilege of self-incrimination where the defendant's silence was only one mat-
ter in a fact-filled record establishing defendant's misconduct. The Court explained:
[A] prison inmate in Rhode Island electing to remain silent during his
disciplinary hearing ... is not in consequence of his silence automatical-
ly found guilty of the infraction with which he has been charged. Under
Rhode Island law, disciplinary decisions "must be based on substantial
evidence manifested in the records of the disciplinary proceeding." It is
thus undisputed that an inmate's silence in and of itself is insufficient to
support an adverse decision by the Disciplinary Board. In this respect,
this case is very different from the circumstances . . .where refusal to
submit to interrogation and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege,
standing alone and without regard to the other evidence, resulted in loss
of employment or opportunity to contract with the State. There, failure to
respond to interrogation was treated as a final admission of guilt. Here
Palmigiano remained silent at the hearing in the face of evidence that
incriminated him; and, as far as this record reveals, his silence was





abrogate the policies of the fifth amendment privilege.
The Supreme Court has long upheld the constitutional
permissibility of an inference in a civil proceeding where the
accused asserts his fifth amendment privilege. In Baxter v.
Palmigiano, the Court upheld an instruction to a prisoner
charged in a prison disciplinary proceeding that "he had a
right to remain silent during the hearing but that if he re-
mained silent his silence would be held against him."97 The
Supreme Court found no violation of the right to remain silent,
in part, because the prisoner's silence was not conclusive on
the issue of his liability for breach of prison rules. Rather "his
silence was given no more evidentiary value than was warrant-
ed by the facts surrounding his case."" The inference was
deemed "a realistic reflection of the evidentiary significance of
the choice to remain silent."99 In other words, the inference
that the prisoner did not speak because he had nothing to offer
in his defense was a logical evidentiary conclusion-not a
"compulsion" to speak and incriminate himself."'
The decision in Pamigliano departed from the broader
language used by the Court in Griffin v. California.' The
Supreme Court had ruled in Griffin that to permit a negative
inference from a claim of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion asserted in a criminal case would violate constitutional
guarantees. The negative inference was deemed a penalty that
constituted compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.
Before Griffin's ban on negative inferences in criminal
cases, when a defendant asserted her or his right to remain
silent, traditional evidentiary doctrines frequently had been
applied to a defendant's silence to permit a negative inference.
One such principle applied was that of adoptive admis-
sions.' This principle allowed a defendant's silence to be ad-
" Id. at 312.
o' Id. at 318.
9 Id.
'oo Accord Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); see
also Heidt, supra note 13, at 1062.
101 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
1"' See 4 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1072, at 118 n.11; Confessions, 79 IIARV. L.
REV. 935, 1038 (1966); Silence as Evidence of Guilt, 23 GEO. L.J. 331 (1935); Don-
ald P. Barrett, Admissibility of Accusatory Statements as Adoptive Admissions
when Defendant is Under Arrest, 35 CAL. L. REV. 128 (1947); Colvin A. Peterson,
Jr., Silence to Accusation While Under Arrest as Admission of Guilt, 47 MICH. L.
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mitted if a response in the face of a damaging accusation or
statement made in the defendant's presence naturally would
be expected. 10 3 That is, one ordinarily responds to accusations
that are untrue and, therefore, silence where one naturally
would speak amounts to acquiescence. Although such an infer-
ence at times may be a logical evidentiary conclusion, it ap-
pears inconsistent with a criminal defendant's right to have
the prosecution shoulder the entire burden of proof. It may
also impinge on the defendant's right to freedom from compul-
sion to speak. To effectuate these constitutional imperatives, a
negative inference based upon the defendant's invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination may be intolerable in a
criminal case. 4
III. THE DESIRABILITY OF PENALIZING INVOCATIONS OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE BY ALLOWING A NEGATVE
INFERENCE
Courts differ in their opinions on the evidentiary signifi-
cance of an assertion of the attorney-client privilege.' Some
allow negative inferences, others do not. Most of the case law
analyzing the policy of the privilege, however, end up forbid-
ding the inference.
A. Cases Allowing Negative Inference
There is considerable case law allowing a negative infer-
ence upon the claim of attorney-client privilege. Some cases
allowing a negative inference from failure to waive the attor-
ney-client privilege consider the attorney similar to a withheld
witness and therefore apply the "missing-witness" rule of evi-
REV. 715 (1949); Melvin Schleuter, Silence as an Admission in a Criminal Trial in
Illinois, 1951 U. ILL. L.F. 315.
"' The Court has held that a defendant's silence following Miranda warnings
cannot give rise to an adoptive admission because implicit in the warnings is a
promise that silence will not be used against the defendant. See, e.g., Dolye v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
""' But see Office of Legal Policy, Dep't of Justice, Adverse Inferences From
Silence, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 1005 (1989).
105 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2322, at 630. Dean Wigmore believes the pre-
vailing view, if not the better view, is to disallow a negative inference when the
privilege is invoked. Id.
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dence. The missing-witness rule provides that if a party knows
of the existence of an available witness on a material issue and
that witness is within the party's control, yet without satisfac-
tory explanation the party fails to call this witness, an infer-
ence may arise that the testimony would not have been favor-
able."'
The second rationale relied upon by courts allowing a
negative inference where the attorney-client privilege is
claimed is an analogy to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The privilege against self-incrimination shields from com-
pelled disclosure information that might subject the privilege
holder to criminal liability. As discussed above, a negative
inference upon an assertion of that privilege has been held
constitutionally intolerable in criminal cases but permissible in
civil matters."7 Where the attorney-cient privilege has been
claimed, some courts have allowed a negative inference in civil
cases but not in criminal cases, thereby emphasizing the di-
chotomy between civil and criminal contexts.' 8
The adverse inference has been examined extensively in
106 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 180 (1967); see also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 2, §
286, at 199; accord Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893) ("if a party
has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testimony would
elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does not do it creates a presumption
that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable"); People v. Smith, 60
A.D.2d 963, 401 N.Y.S.2d 606 (4th Dept 1978). Some courts not only appear will-
ing to receive relevant testimony from a party's lawyer, but are inclined to allow
an adverse inference if the attorney's testimony is absent, so long as the criteria
of the missing-witness rule are satisfied. See, e.g., McCooe v. Dighton, 53 N.E.
133, 134 (Mass. 1899) (Holmes, J.). In some of these cases, the client has waived
the privilege, although perhaps not intentionally, by his testimony or by asserting
a claim or defense that relies on the attorney's advice as one of its elements. See
Alan Stephens, Annotation, Adverse Presumption or Inference Based on Party's
Failure to Produce or Examine that Party's Attorney, 78 A.L.R.4th 571 (1990).
Cases where the privilege has been waived are irrelevant to the discussion herein.
This Article addresses the propriety of an adverse inference in those instances
where the confidential attorney-client communications are not relied on by the
privilege holder as an element of her claim or defense and where the privilege has
not otherwise been waived. See Donald E. Evins, Annotation, Propriety and Preju-
dicial Refusal to Permit Introduction of Privileged Testimony, 32 A.L.R.3d 906, 913
n.17 (1970). Some courts exclude privileged communications from the missing-wit-
ness doctrine altogether. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662 (N.D. 1976).
107 See supra notes 97-100.
, See, e.g., Electro Med. Sys. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1057
(fed. Cir. 1994) (allowing negative inference in civil case); United States v.




the area of patent infringement. Some courts have held that an
alleged infringer's failure to waive the attorney-client privilege
and disclose the attorney's advice bears on the state of mind of
the alleged infringer, thereby permitting an inference that the
lawyer's advice was unfavorable."0 9 This rationale seems
modeled on the missing-witness doctrine. In such cases the
negative inference allowed is so strong that it has been held
dispositive on the issue of the alleged infringer's willfulness of
infringement,"0 an element of a patent infringement damag-
es claim.
Outside of the subject area of patent infringement, other
cases also have permitted negative inferences upon a claim of
attorney-client privilege, again apparently relying on the miss-
ing-witness doctrine. For example, in Chromalloy Mining &
Minerals v. NLRB, the NLRB found an employer liable for
unfair labor practices in discharging employees."' The
NLRB's finding was grounded in part on an adverse inference
drawn by the administrative law judge from the employer's re-
fusal to produce certain documents and files it had compiled on
the discharged employees."' The employer withheld produc-
tion of the requested files on the grounds of attorney-client
privilege. Without disputing the validity of the privilege claim,
the administrative law judge drew a negative inference that
the files contained unfavorable information to the employer.
' Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987). For a discussion of the appropriateness
of permitting adverse inferences on the issue of willfulness of infringement from
the failure to waive the attorney-client privilege, see Timothy N. Trop, Negative
Inferences from the Absence of Attorney Testimony in Patent Cases, 15 AIPLA Q.J.
50 (1987).
1 See, e.g., ALM Surgical Equip., Inc. v. Kirschner Med. Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
1241, 1251 n.6. ALM Surgical held that Kirschner's failure to produce any of its
lawyers' opinions, none of which had been relied on by Kirschner and all of which
remained privileged on the issues of infringement, validity and enforceability of
the patent, permitted the jury to draw the inference that the lawyers' advice was
unfavorable to Kirschner. "The conclusion is inescapable that had Kirschner consid-
ered these opinions evidence of their good faith they would have produced them at
trial." This conclusion reduces the attorney's status to that of an ordinary missing-
witness. See Trop, supra note 109, at 111.
"1 620 F.2d 1120, 1127 (5th Cir. 1980) (in affirming the NLRB finding of unfair
labor practices, the Fifth Circuit did not reach the issue of the permissibility of
allowing a negative inference for failure to produce documents shielded by the
attorney-client privilege from disclosure).
112 Id.
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A number of state court cases similarly have allowed ad-
verse inferences. Arizona implicitly relies on the rationale of
the missing-witness doctrine allowing an assertion of the attor-
ney-client privilege to be considered by the fact-finder in its
determination of disputed facts. In one such case, United Cali-
fornia Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, a hotel
developer and construction lender sued Prudential, the intend-
ed permanent lender, in Arizona state court for breach of con-
tract.1 ' In its defense, Prudential called its lawyers to testify
about non-privileged conversations with plaintiffs during the
negotiations. On cross-examination, the plaintiff inquired into
privileged communications between the defendant's lawyers
and Prudential during the negotiations. The trial court allowed
the plaintiff to inquire as to the privileged conversations, thus
requiring Prudential's attorneys to invoke the attorney-client
privilege repeatedly before the jury. Although the court upheld
every one of defendant Prudential's invocations of the attorney-
client privilege, it gave the following explanation for requiring
the defendant to invoke the privilege repeatedly before the
jury: "[Ilf [the plaintiff] can't get the evidence in,... the jury
has a right to know why they can't get the evidence in.""1
The Arizona court's procedure was designed to inform the
jury that the defendant was to blame for withholding evidence.
The trial court's ruling required the lawyer testifying for the
defense to assert the attorney-client privilege over 100 times in
front of the jury. This could have no effect other than to preju-
dice the privilege holder for invoking its privilege since it inevi-
tably would cause the jury to wonder whether the defense was
withholding damaging evidence. Even without jury instruction
on the matter, the court virtually assured that the jury would
consider the assertion of the privilege in evaluating the
strength of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses."5
w 681 P.2d 390 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
... Id. at 445.
.. The court refused to give a jury instruction requested by Prudential that no
adverse inference could be drawn from its attorney's claims of privilege. It also
refused a jury instruction affirmatively allowing a negative inference to be drawn.
Instead, the court remained silent on the propriety of drawing an adverse infer-
ence, leaving the jury to its own devices, unfettered by judicial supervision. The
court obliquely instructed the jury not to guess at the answers to questions that
had been objected to where the objection was sustained. This instruction did not
rehabilitate any damage to the credibility of the witnesses arising from their being
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No other purpose could have been served, especially as the
court had advance notice of the questions and of the
defendant's valid claims of the attorney-client privilege from
the pretrial discovery."' The court's ruling was made without
reference to the policies of the attorney-client privilege and
without an assessment of whether the privilege's policies were
impeded or advanced by requiring invocation of the privilege
repeatedly in front of the jury.
Another example of a state court rejecting the negative
inference but allowing the jury to hear the assertion of the
privilege occurred in a Pennsylvania criminal case. In Penn-
sylvania v. Sims, a non-party accomplice witness called by the
prosecution invoked the attorney-client privilege during cross-
examination outside the jury's presence." 7 The defense ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which ruled that
this claim of attorney-client privilege should not be insulated
from disclosure to the jury. The Sims court reasoned that re-
quiring the invocation of the privilege to occur in front of the
jury properly allowed the jury a basis for questioning the testi-
forced to assert repeatedly the privilege in front of the jury. Such a scenario of
events undoubtedly depicted Prudential as someone who wrongly had withheld
relevant evidence from the trial record. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court, holding either that there was no prejudice or, alternative-
ly, that it was harmless error. Id. at 447.
.. Other cases have permitted a negative inference to arise by a client's not
calling or not allowing his lawyer to testify about privileged communications. See.
e.g., Harris v. C.I.R., 461 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1972) (permitting negative inference
where drafting attorney did not testify regarding the omission of critical language
in gifts transferred to trusts; the tax court inferred the testimony would have been
unfavorable and disallowed the transfer as gifts); Marcus v. Marcus, 394 A.2d 727
(Conn. 1978) (in an action where a husband's lawyer did not testify to the defini-
tion of "income" in an action to enforce a separation agreement, the court allowed
a negative inference holding the lawyer should have withdrawn and testified);
Fried v. Bradley, 52 So. 2d 247 (La. 1950) (negative inference allowed where the
heirs contesting the deed conveying estate property failed to call attorneys who
prepared the deed; the suit was dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds); In re
McFadden, 108 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954) (a negative inference was allowed
in a will contest, where although the attorney was the will's scribe and executing
witness, he did not testify); Bayou Drilling Co. v. Baillio, 312 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1958) (court allowed negative inference where creditor sued to collect debt
and foreclose on chattel and an attorney testified to some matters but not others).
But see Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 705 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App.
1986) (the court refused to draw a negative inference, reasoning that the attorney-
client privilege barred the testimony).
11 521 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. 1987).
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mony of the government witness"8 and reflected upon the
witness' credibility and reliability. By insulating the witness
from invoking his privilege in the jury's presence, the trial
court unfairly bolstered the credibility of a witness whose testi-
mony was crucial to the success of the prosecution."9
Without even a cursory examination of the goals of the
attorney-client privilege, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
declared "[t]here is nothing in the privilege or its purposes
which militates against allowing the jury to at least know that
a claimant of the privilege, while testifying as a witness, has
elected to withhold from the jury's consideration possible previ-
ous statements made by him concerning the matter on tri-
al."20 The basis of the court's ruling that the jury should be
allowed to hear and consider a prosecution witness's claim of
attorney-client privilege appeared to be the concern for a
defendant's confrontation clause rights rather than an evalua-
tion of the impact of a negative inference on the policies of the
attorney-client privilege.' 2 '
Similarly, in a criminal case for murder in Mississippi,
Stringer v. State, an accomplice witness called by the prose-
cutor also asserted his attorney-client privilege on cross-exami-
nation.12 In closing argument, the defense lawyer argued to
the jury that, although the accomplice had the right to claim
the privilege, he would not have claimed the privilege if he had
nothing to hide." Defense counsel was permitted to urge the
jury to draw an adverse inference without the court's interfer-
ence.
In addition to the missing-witness rationale, courts have
relied on an analogy to the privilege against self-incrimination
to allow an adverse inference upon a claim of attorney-client
privilege. In criminal cases no adverse inference may be drawn
from an assertion of the privilege against self-incrimina-
UI Id.
',9 Id. at 396.
120 Id. at 397.
1 Concern for a criminal defendant's guarantees under the Confrontation
Clause properly outweigh concern for the policies of the attorney-client privilege.
See infra text accompanying notes 228.
122 500 So. 2d 928 (Miss. 1986).
"2 Id. at 940.
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tion.24 But in civil cases an adverse inference has been held
constitutionally permissible when the privilege against self-
incrimination is asserted." For example, in an Illinois case,
Monco v. Janus Enterprises, a negative inference was allowed
upon assertion of the attorney-client privilege where the plain-
tiff, a shareholder in a privately held corporation, sued to dis-
solve the corporation and the defendant counterclaimed to void
an assignment of intellectual property to the corporation.1 26
The plaintiff defef±ded against the counterclaims by arguing
that the defendant had ratified the transactions.1 27 To dem-
onstrate the defendant's knowledge, an element of the claim,
the plaintiff questioned the defendant about what he had told
his lawyer and when. In response, the defendant properly
asserted his attorney-client privilege."2 Since the defendant
had not put his attorney communications or his state of mind
in issue-only the plaintiff had-there was no dispute over
whether the claim of privilege had been waived. Nonetheless,
the Illinois circuit court ruled that defendant's "repeated asser-
tions of the attorney-client privilege required a negative infer-
ence to be drawn" with respect to defendant's knowledge. 2"'
The Illinois circuit court merely asserted that the negative
inference was appropriate because a similar inference was
permissible upon claims of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in civil matters. 3 Yet in transposing the permissibility
of a negative inference from one privilege to another, the court
failed to compare the underlying policies of the two privileges
to determine whether they were sufficiently similar to warrant
the same evidentiary consequences.
Like Illinois, Massachusetts also has permitted both sum-
mation comment and an adverse inference to be drawn upon
an assertion of the attorney-client privilege in civil cases. In
Phillips v. Chase, an action to set aside an adoption decree, the
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
'0 Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1983); see su-
pra text accompanying notes 98-101.
2' 583 N2E.2d 575, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
127 Id.
'" Id. at 584.
129 Id.
10 Id. at 584-85. On appeal, the appellate court declined to express any opinion
on the permissibility of the negative inference. Id. at 585.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts allowed comment
upon and a negative inference from an assertion of the attor-
ney-client privilege.'3 ' Both the plaintiff and defendant were
successors to the estate that held the attorney-client privilege
and, thus, both were privilege holders who could waive or as-
sert the privilege. The defendant claimed the privilege and
refused to waive it, while the plaintiff willingly waived the
privilege. The court held, in this context, that the refusal to
waive was properly the subject of comment to the jury.'32 In
allowing an adverse inference upon claim of attorney-client
privilege the court analogized to the privilege against self-in-
crimination: "I]f evidence is material and competent except for
a personal privilege of one of the parties to have it excluded
under the law, his claim of the privilege may be referred to in
argument and considered by the jury, as indicating his opinion
that the evidence, if received, would be prejudicial to him." "'s
Phillips involves very unusual facts because both parties
to the lawsuit held the same privilege. Where one party was
willing to offer the evidence into the record and the other party
fought against its introduction, the logic is overwhelming that
the information helped the one party's position in the lawsuit
to the detriment of the other. This unusual set of facts gives
rise to an inference, but it does not spring purely from the bare
assertion of the attorney-client privilege.
As demonstrated by the cases discussed above, courts
allowing the negative inference have failed to consider the
justifications or goals of the attorney-client privilege. These
courts have ignored whether the inference promotes or at least
does not substantially impede the underlying principles of the
privilege. The courts' conclusory statements-for example, in
Sims-hardly amount to an evaluation of the impact of an
" 87 NS. 755 (Mass. 1909); see also McCooe v. Dighton, 53 N.E. 133 (Mass.
1899) (Holmes, J.). In McCooe, a case involving a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, the court asserted: "In a civil case, if one of the parties insists upon his
privilege to exclude testimony that would throw light upon the merits of the case
and the truth of his testimony, we are of opinion that it is a proper subject for
comment." Id. at 134. Although the court used the term "comment," it was refer-
ring to argument in summation where one party asks the jury to add up the evi-
dence and draw inferences. Thus, the court permitted an inference to follow upon
the claim of the privilege.




inference on the goals of the privilege. The decisions allowing
negative inference thus appear to have been made without
considering the impact this evidentiary consequence will have
on the attorney-client privilege. The result in Sims may be
correct, but not because the policies of the attorney-client privi-
lege are not impeded, but because they are outweighed by the
interests of justice in a criminal case.
B. Cases Prohibiting Negative Inference
A number of cases have not allowed a negative inference
when the attorney-client privilege is asserted." One decision
by the appellate court of Illinois, Regan v. Garfield Ridge Trust
& Savings Bank,"' apparently conflicts with other Illinois
authority on this question.1"6 The plaintiffs in Regan pur-
chased real property and brought an action for specific perfor-
mance and tortious interference with contract when the deal
fell through."7 The plaintiffs called the two lawyers who had
represented them during the transaction to testify about deal-
ings and non-privileged conversations the lawyers had had
With the defendants. Recognizing that selective disclosure of
privileged communications would waive the privilege, the court
ruled that the attorney's testimony did not constitute a waiver
of the privilege. The court based its distinction on the fact that
the plaintiffs had called their lawyers to testify only about non-
privileged conversations with the defendants and no privileged
information had been elicited on direct examination. The
Regan court therefore affirmed the jury instruction that an as-
sertion of the privilege during cross-examination should not
result in an adverse inference against plaintiffs."'
'" See, e.g., A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal
dismissed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 878 (1952); Wentworth v.
Lloyd, 10 H.L. Cas. 591 (1864).
" 581 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). Regan also is almost factually identical
to United California Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983), but reached the opposite result. See supra text accompanying notes
114-15.
" See Monco v. Janus Enters., 583 N.E.2d 575 (Mii. App. Ct. 1991); see also
supra text accompanying notes 125-31 (discussing the rationale of allowing a nega-
tive inference upon the assertion of the attorney-client privilege in civil matters).
"7 Regan, 581 N.E.2d at 761.
"3 Id. at 768.
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The Regan court reasoned that to permit a negative infer-
ence would undermine one of the primary goals of the attor-
ney-client privilege: candor in communications between client
and lawyer. The court explained that "[a~llowing such an infer-
ence to be drawn could inhibit communications between attor-
ney and client especially with respect to contractual transac-
tions where there is often a possibility that the attorney will be
called to testify if there is a contractual breach and litigation
ensues.""3
9
In a similar recognition of the policy behind the attorney-
client privilege, the court in A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr rejected the
adverse inference." The A.B. Dick Company brought an ac-
tion alleging patent infringement but refused to produce the
documents at issue. At this stage of the proceedings, A.B. Dick
itself was being investigated for fabrication of evidence. A.B.
Dick withheld documents that the court had demanded by as-
serting the attorney-client privilege. The question arose wheth-
er the court should allow a negative inference from the invoca-
tion of the privilege. Despite the court's strong interest in in-
vestigating whether a fraud had been perpetrated upon it, the
court ruled that this assertion of the privilege "can give rise to
no adverse inferences."'
The A.B. Dick court recognized the importance of the at-
torney-client privilege to the proper administration of jus-
tice.14 Examining the history of the attorney-client privilege,
the court gave the following explanation for protecting commu-
nications between lawyer and client:
[Flormerly persons appeared in court themselves; but as business
multiplied and became more intricate... both the distance of places
and the multiplicity of business made it absolutely necessary that
there should be a set of people who should stand in the place of
suitors, and these persons are called attorneys. Since this has been
thought necessary, all people and all courts have looked upon that
confidence between the party and the attorney to be so great that it
would be destructive to all business if attorneys were to disclose the
business of their clients.... The reason why attorneys are not to be
examined to anything relating to their clients or their affairs is
m39 Id.
14 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d





because they would destroy the confidence that is necessary to be
preserved between them.'
After acknowledging the early foundations of the privilege, the
court observed that the
necessity of protecting the attorney-client relationship has become
even more apparent; the legal rights and duties of large corporations
and those who dispute with them would not be susceptible of judicial
administration in the absence of lawyers, nor, in the absence of the
privilege could lawyers properly represent their clients.'
The court refused to draw an adverse inference from a claim of
the attorney-client privilege because it "would contribute to the
undermining" of the privilege.145
Although the A.B. Dick court concluded that allowing an
adverse inference would contribute to undermining the
privilege's policies, it failed to explain explicitly how a negative
inference-without disclosure of the confidential communica-
tions-compromised the privilege.14  The court offered
conclusory explanations, stating that its ruling was necessary
to protect the attorney-client relationship to enable "lawyers to
properly represent their clients"'47 and to aid in the judicial
administration of disputes between corporations.'
A more recent case denying a negative inference upon
claim of attorney-client privilege arose in federal court in Min-
nesota. In Ardito v. Johnson & Johnson, the scope of a release
that was asserted as a defense was in issue on a motion for
summary judgment.' The defendant, Johnson & Johnson,
refused to produce files that were relevant to the release as
within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege. The Ardito
court relied on the rule developed in the A.B. Dick decision to
fird that "[n]o adverse inference may be drawn as a matter of
law from the legitimate assertion of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 150
1 Id. (quoting Annesley v. Earl of Angeales, 17 How. St. Tr. 1225 (1743)).
144 Id. at 102.
14 Id.
146 For the A.B. Dick court, the privilege appears absolute, arising from utilitari-
an roots.
147 A.B. Dick, 95 F. Supp. at 102.
148 Id.
'4 CIV. No. 4-81-922, 1985 WL 2461 (D. Minn. July 22, 1985).
... Id. at *5-6. Similarly, a California state court in Metzger v. Silverman, 133
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The Iowa Supreme Court, in Lauer v. Banning, recognized
that the adverse inference nullified the policy goals of the
privilege. 5' Lauer involved an action for breach of the prom-
ise to marry in which the plaintiff refused to testify about com-
munications with her lawyer. The Iowa Supreme Court upheld
the trial court's instruction to the jury prohibiting speculation
about withheld testimony. The court emphasized: "If one must,
upon penalty of having a presumption raised against him, in-
troduce his lawyer or physician, the statutes prohibiting them
from testifying are of no significance."' In prohibiting a neg-
ative inference, the Lauer court specifically rejected the analo-
gy of the missing-witness doctrine:
Of course the ordinary rule is that if one does not produce testimony
within his control, or prevents the use of such testimony, the pre-
sumption arises that such testimony, if produced would be adverse
to them. But this rule does not apply to privileged communications
for reasons too obvious to mention."
Some courts have upheld the right of the party invoking
the privilege to not be required to assert the privilege repeat-
edly in the presence of the jury." 4 For example, in Stanger v.
Gordon, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that it was im-
proper to permit continued cross-examination of a witness that
was designed solely to require the witness repeatedly to assert
the attorney-client privilege before the jury." In this action
by a former employee for fraud against his employer, the court
Cal. Rptr. 355 (App. Dept Super. Ct. 1976), forbade the inference in a case where
a lawyer's motivation for filing a civil suit in the wrong jurisdiction was at issue.
After the suit was dismissed, the lawyer was personally sued for costs by the
aggrieved party. To determine liability, the court had to inquire into the attorney's
factual basis and good faith in bringing the suit in the wrong jurisdiction. The
lawyer's factual basis for his actions arose from confidential communications with
his client that the attorney-client privilege prohibited him from disclosing. The
court ruled that it could draw no adverse inference from an assertion of the privi-
lege, relying on the California Code of Evidence. For a discussion of state statutes
governing adverse inferences upon claim of privilege, see infra text accompanying
notes 174-78.
161 131 N.W. 783 (Iowa 1911).
152 Id. at 785.
10 Id.
"' See, e.g., Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 705 S.W.2d 565,
570-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to draw a negative inference and reasoning
that the attorney-client privilege barred the testimony).
1ss 244 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. 1976).
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also ruled that it was improper to permit counsel to comment
adversely in summation on the exercise of the privilege." 6
A review of the civil cases disallowing a negative inference
upon a claim of attorney-client privilege reveals that courts
typically reach this conclusion after consideration of the
privilege's purposes and goals. Occasionally, in criminal cases,
a court without explanation disallows a negative inference
upon claim of the attorney-client privilege, leading one to sus-
pect that its decision is based on an analogy to the ban on such
inferences when the privilege against self-incrimination is
asserted in criminal cases. The Michigan case of People v.
Parks, which rejected the permissibility of an adverse inference
against the defendant in a criminal case, provides an example
of a court using an analogy of this type.157
In Parks, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a convic-
tion because of an improper cross-examination of the defendant
about notes governed by the attorney-client privilege. On redi-
rect, defense counsel attempted to mitigate the damage to the
defendant from the cross-examination into the privileged notes.
Defense counsel asked the defendant questions to establish
that the notes were the product of the attorney-client relation-
ship. The prosecutor, however, apparently in the presence of
the jury, insisted on the right to inspect the notes that the
defense argued were shielded by the attorney-client privilege.
In the jury's presence, the court suggested that the prosecutor
should be permitted to see the notes, yet after the jury was
excused all parties agreed the notes were privileged.
The Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that it was improper
for the prosecutor to pursue the privileged notes in order to
force the defendant to claim the attorney-client privilege in the
jury's presence as the protection of the attorney-client privilege
is "destroyed if improper inference can be drawn from its exer-
cise." 5 ' The Michigan appellate court assumed that improper
inference would follow automatically from the jury observing
the defendant assert the privilege. Whether the court reasoned
from the policies of the attorney-client privilege or intuitively
6 ' Id. at 631-32.
117 296 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).




applied the approach required in the fifth amendment context
is unclear.
Similarly, in State v. Thomas, a Connecticut murder trial,
part of the state's proof consisted of the defendant's lack of
action, which allegedly evinced his consciousness of guilt.'59
This non-action included the defendant's unwillingness to com-
municate and cooperate with his murdered girlfriend's family
in the family's attempts to locate their unexplainedly absent
daughter. 60 To rebut the prosecution's evidence of non-action
and to explain his uncooperativeness, Thomas called his former
lawyer as a defense witness to testify that counsel had advised
Thomas not to make any statements or talk to anyone.'16
Outside the jury's presence, the defense sought a ruling to
minimize cross-examination questions from the prosecutor
which would require the defense to invoke the attorney-client
privilege.'62 Although apparently not unsympathetic to the
defense request, the judge saw no practical way to avoid hav-
ing the defendant assert the privilege before the jury.60 Un-
like in civil cases,' there had been no pretrial discovery of
the defendant in this criminal case, thus the questions to be
asked and the objections based on privilege could only be spec-
ulative. Although the court refused to tie the prosecution's
hands during cross-examination it did request that the prose-
cutor minimize defendant's need to invoke the privilege before
the jury.165
To protect the defendant further, the Thomas court in-
structed the jury that " It]he defendant has a right to assert the
attorney-client privilege... and the fact that objection was
made on that ground shall not be held against the defendant
in any way."'66 The court did not explain its reasons for pro-
tecting a claim of the attorney-client privilege from negative
inference and did not expressly or implicitly examine the ef-
' ' 533 A.2d 553 (Conn. 1987).
..0 Id. at 557-58.
"' Id. at 558.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 559.
"' See United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 681 P.2d 390 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1983), where pretrial discovery had alerted the court and parties that the
lawyers would assert the privilege in response to numerous questions.
161 See Thomas, 533 A.2d at 559 n.7.
' Id. at 559 n.9.
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fects of a negative inference on purposes of the attorney-client
privilege. Again, it is likely the court forbade any negative
inference upon this criminal defendant's claim of attorney-
client privilege because it failed to distinguish the attorney-
client privilege from the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 7 On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court
upheld the jury instruction. The court rejected the defendant's
claim and found that the jury instruction prohibiting adverse
inference cured any harm that may have resulted from
defendant's having to assert his attorney-client privilege in
front of the jury.6 '
In a criminal case that involved this issue, the Arizona Su-
preme Court, in State v. Holsinger, found that cross-exami-
nation questions that required the defendant to assert her
attorney-client privilege before the jury prejudiced her and
constituted error.'69 The court explained that forcing the de-
fendant to assert the privilege in the presence of the jury auto-
matically created an impermissible inference that could "lead
the jury to believe she had something to hide."'70 The
Holsinger court sought to avoid the prejudice to the defendant
that it believed arose inevitably from an assertion of the attor-
ney-client privilege before the jury.1 ' The court's decision ex-
"6 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (forbidding adverse inference in
criminal cases where privilege against self-incrimination is invoked by defendant).
168 Thomas, 533 A.2d at 559. People v. Quesada, 281 Cal. Rptr. 426 (Ct. App.
1991), is another criminal case where a court refused to draw an adverse inference
upon assertion of the attorney-client privilege. In Quesada, the defendant chal-
lenged his guilty plea on the ground that he had not been advised he could be
deported as a consequence of a felony narcotics conviction. At the hearing to set
aside the conviction, the defendant testified that his former lawyer did not advise
him about possible immigration consequences. The court granted the defendant's
request for a continuance to secure his former lawyer's testimony. The former
lawyer declined to testify pursuant to the attorney-client privilege. Despite what
appears to be a clear waiver of the attorney-client privilege involving the lawyer's
advice about the possibility of immigration consequences arising out of the
defendant's testimony on this subject, the court declined to draw any inference
from the assertion of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 532 n.3. By testifying to
the substance of the attorney's advice, the defendant placed the content of the
advice at issue. The privilege was waived by defendant's litigation position. There-
fore, application of the missing-witness rule could have permitted the court to
draw an adverse inference, although no such inference would have been compelled
by the missing-witness rule. See supra note 106.
1 9 601 P.2d 1054 (Ariz. 1979).
0 Id. at 1058-59.
17 Id. at 1059.
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pressly relied on the policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege:
When the client, especially one accused of crimes, asks for advice
and guidance in the premises, he should be able to speak freely
without any fear and in full confidence that what is said by him or
to him by his attorney will not be subsequently subject to disclosure
if he takes the witness stand during the trial of his case. Any other
policy than strict inviolability.., would seriously hamper the ad-
ministration of justice, for the client would perhaps refrain from
telling the truth or withhold the truth, while the lawyer would be
reluctant to give the correct advice and counsel if he thought it
would be subject to disclosure in the event his client took the stand
to testify in his own behalf.172
None of the criminal cases discussed here and observed in
additional research forbid a negative inference upon a claim of
attorney-client privilege on the basis of the impact a negative
inference might have on a criminal defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. Yet, if a criminal defendant's refusal to
disclose attorney-client communications is allowed to assist in
conviction of the defendant, then consulting with counsel be-
comes a detriment to a person accused of crime. Although the
cases have neglected this possibility, a negative inference upon
a claim of attorney-client privilege may be incompatible with
In the instant case, it is clear that the effect if not the intent of the
question was to force the defendant either to waive the attorney-client
privilege or to invoke the privilege before the jury. She was thus on the
horns of a dilemma-she could waive the privilege which might have
resulted in testimony damaging to her, or she could invoke the privilege
and lead the jury to believe she had something to hide.
.A] party should not be put upon such onerous horns of a dilemma
during a jury trial. In the forensic battlefield of a contested trial, the
contrast is striking in the effect on a jury between a witness whose an-
swers are full and frank and a witness who refuses to answer . .. what-
ever the merit . . . for such refusal or objection. There is an understand-
able rapport begotten between witness and the jury in the one case,
while in the other there is a recognizably devastating adverse effect upon
the witness' standing before the jury."
Id. (quoting Vilardi v. 'Vilardi, 200 Misc. 1043, 1045-46, 107 N.Y.S.2d 342, 344-45
(Sup. Ct. New York County 1951)). Holsinger, with the defendant testifying as to
the substance of the attorney's advice and putting the content of the advice in
issue, could properly have been analyzed under the missing-witness rule. The
privilege was waived therefore application of the missing-witness rule could have
permitted the court to draw an adverse inference.
172 Id. at 1058-59.
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more than just the policies of the attorney-client privilege; it
also may be inconsistent with the sixth amendment guarantee
of competent counsel.
IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO NEGATIVE INFERENCES UPON
CLAIMS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Model codes of evidence conflict about the appropriateness
of an adverse inference upon a claim of privilege. The Model
Code of Evidence allows the inference while the Uniform Rules
of Evidence do not.1 3 Codes of evidence that have questioned
the appropriateness of an adverse inference upon claims of
privilege have not distinguished between different privileges.
Instead, they typically adopt one rule and apply it to all privi-
leges.
The Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"), enacted in 1976,
are silent on the permissibility of an inference arising from
claims of privilege.174 Congress deleted a proposed rule that
would have banned any adverse inference for all claims of
privilege and instead adopted Rule 501. FRE 501 recognizes
and implements a federal common law of privilege to be devel-
oped and interpreted by the federal courts in the light of "rea-
173 Compare MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 233 (1942) (allowing inference)
with UNIF. R. EvID. 39 (1953) (amended 1974) (banning inference). There may be
diversity cases, however, where a" claim or defense is based upon federal law. In
those cases, federal privilege law will apply to a claim or defense based upon
federal law. In most nondiverse jurisdiction cases, federal privilege law will apply.
See Notes of the Committee on the Judiciary No. 93-650, FED. R. EVID. 501.
1' The Federal Rules of Evidence, as originally proposed to Congress, contained
13 privilege rules including Proposed Rule 513, which banned an inference, regu-
lated comment upon an inference from a claim of privilege, and governed jury
instructions related to such a claim. The Advisory Committee amended Article V
of the proposed Federal Rules to eliminate all of the rules related to privilege, and
instead adopted the current Rule 501, which provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Su-
preme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness,
person, governlnent, state or political subdivision thereof shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.
However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim of defense, as to which state law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, state or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be determined in accordance with state law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
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son and experience."'75 The Federal Rules of Evidence are si-
lent on the question of a negative inference upon claims of
privilege.
State evidence codes conflict about the permissibility of a
negative inference arising from claims of attorney-client privi-
lege. 76 States have adopted various approaches. Fourteen
states have adopted codes of evidence that govern privilege law
along the lines of FRE 501.177 These states continue to imple-
ment a common law of privilege and, like the Federal Rules of
Evidence, their state evidence codes themselves take no posi-
tion on negative inferences arising from claims of any privi-
lege. Such state codes leave the question of negative inference
to be decided by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Many
states have not yet considered the issue.
Five state evidence codes contain more specific and de-
scriptive provisions regarding state privilege law. 8 These
states have codified recognition of the attorney-client privilege
and various other privileges. These codes, however, remain
silent on the permissibility of a negative inference arising from
176 An exception exists in some civil actions, principally diversity jurisdiction
cases, where state privilege law will typically govern. The Federal Rules allow the
use of both the federal common law of privilege and state privilege law, depending
on the whether a federal or state rule of law is applicable. Thus, as the commen-
tary to FED. R. EVmD. 501 explains, state privilege law applies in diversity cases in
federal court, in nondiversity federal questions in civil cases where an issue gov-
erned by state substantive law is the object of the evidence, and in those instanc-
es where state privilege law is to be applied-for example in proof of a state issue
in a nondiversity case where a close reading discloses that state privilege law is
not to be applied unless the matter to be proved is an element of that state claim
or defense as distinguished from a step along the way in its proof. FED. R. EVID.
501, Conference Comm. Notes, H. REP. No. 93-1597.
176 Forty-three states have enacted codes of evidence. The seven states having
no code of evidence are Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New
York and Virginia.
177 See 17A ARIz. REV. ANN. 501 (West 1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501
(Bradford Pub. Co. 1994); 6B FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.501 (West 1979); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 501 (West 1989); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 501 (West 1983); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 501 (West 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. 501 (West 1984) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 501
(Michie Co. 1994); O1 REV. CODE ANN. § 501 (Anderson 1994); R.I. CT. R. ANN.
§ 501 (Michie Co. 1991); TENN. COURT R. 501 (Michie Co. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.58.070 (West 1988); W. VA. COURT R. 501 (Michie Co. 1992); WYo. STAT.
§ 501 (Michie Co. 1994).
18 See ALA. CODE § 12-21-161 (Michie Co. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-21
(Michie Co. 1982); PENN. S.S.A. § 5916; S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-10 (Law. Co-op
1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491-060 (West 1994).
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claims of the attorney-client privilege, thereby leaving the
permissibility of a negative inference for the courts.
Twenty-two states have codes of evidence that accept rea-
soning similar to that rejected by Congress in the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 9 These state evidence codes adopt the
position rejected in Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513.
That is, they specifically prohibit the drawing of a negative
inference upon a claim of any privilege, 180 without distin-
guishing between the different evidentiary privileges.'' By so
doing, these state evidence codes neglect the individual policies
behind the various privileges. These codes typically ban not
only adverse inferences from all claims of privilege, but even
prohibit comment on claims of privilege, and require to the
extent practical that claims of privilege occur outside of the
jury's knowledge. A party who invoked a claim of privilege
before the jury may opt for a jury instruction against an ad-
179 ALASKA R. EvID. 512; ARK. R. EvD. 512; CAL. EVID. CODE § 913; DEL.
CODE. ANN. § 512; HAw. R. EVID. 513; IDAHO R. EvID. 512; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
439; KY. R. EVID. 511; MONT. R. EVID. 505; NEB. R. EVID. 27-513; NEV. REV.
STAT. §49.405; N.H. R. EVID. 512; N.J. R. EVID. 532; N.M. R. EVID. 11-513; ND.
R. EVID. 512; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2513; OR. R. EVID. 513; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 109-13; TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 513, TEXL R. EVID. 513; UTAH R. EVID. 507(c);
VT. R. EvID. 512; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.13.
... Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513 provides:
(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege,
whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a
proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be
drawn therefrom.
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, pro-
ceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate
the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.
(c) Jury Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury
might draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to
an instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
20 U.S. DIG. FED. RULES EVID. 493 (Law. ed. 1975).
... The common law of privilege may recognize many different privileges. To
name just a few codified by California, there are interpersonal testimonial privileg-
es, such as the attorney-client privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1966), the
physician-patient privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 994, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014, the husband-wife privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE §
970, the reporter-confidential source privilege, CAL. EVI. CODE § 1041, and the
clergy privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1034. In addition, there also are numerous
other possible privileges of a non-interpersonal communication nature, such as the
privilege against self-incrimination, CAL. EVID. CODE § 940, the trade-secrets privi-
lege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060, the state-secrets privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1040,
the government-informer privilege, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1041, and the political-vote




State evidence codes modeled after Proposed Federal Rule
of Evidence 513 rely on the rationale derived from the law
applicable to claims of the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination as it stood in the early 1970s. The Advisory
Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 513 acknowledge the
Committee's reliance on Griffin v. California, a criminal case
involving a claim of the fifth amendment privilege."2 The
Committee's note quotes the Supreme Court's rationale at that
time, which stated that allowing comment upon the claim of
privilege "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly."" The Advisory Committee then offered its own ratio-
nale for extending the ban to privileges other than the privi-
lege against self-incrimination: 'While the privileges governed
by these rules are not constitutionally based, they are never-
theless founded upon important policies and are entitled to
maximum effect. Hence [513(a)] forbids comment upon the
exercise of a privilege, in accord with the weight of authori-
ty. 1
84
After Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513 was drafted,
however, the Supreme Court undercut the Advisory
Committee's rationale when it modified the law of adverse
inference applicable to claims of the fifth amendment privilege
and permitted the negative inference in civil cases." The re-
sult is that those state evidence codes formulated on Rule 513
rely on outdated law. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee
note to Rule 513, which claimed that a rule banning adverse
inferences from a claim of privilege accorded with the weight of
authority, was incorrect as applied to the attorney-client privi-
lege. In fact, the case law discussing negative inferences that
arise from claims of attorney-client privilege was divided at the
time Rule 513 was proposed. 6
182 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Historically, although not uniformly, case law had not
allowed adverse inference upon claims of the privilege against self-incrimination.
See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2272, at 425-26.
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613.
184 SUPREME COURT STANDARD 513 Advisory Comm. Note quoted in WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 58, at 513-1.
" See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); Brink's Inc. v. City of
New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708-10 (2d Cir. 1983).
18' See supra text accompanying notes 106-72.
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The Advisory Committee's note was correct, nevertheless,
in its conclusion that privileges, such as the attorney-client
privilege, while not constitutionally based, are founded upon
important policies and should be given maximum effect. To
determine the limits of the privilege, one must evaluate the
social policies behind the particular privilege and weigh them
against the competing social policy for truth seeking in the
context of litigation. This evaluation should be conducted on a
privilege-by-privilege basis because the balancing test may
sometimes call for a very strong privilege, while other times
the privilege may be weaker and the competing truth-seeking
policy relatively stronger.'87 Similarly, with a negative infer-
ence, some privileges may be so strong that the underlying
social policies should not be impeded by a negative inference
while other privileges may be weaker and the balancing test
might allow a negative inference because the competing social
policy of truth-seeking is relatively more important to society.
One problem with state evidence codes is that typically they
treat all privileges identically with respect to negative infer-
ence and do not require a privilege-by-privilege determination
of an inference's appropriateness.
Furthermore, state evidence codes normally follow the law
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Many codes are
modeled on the outdated case law protecting the privilege
against self-incrimination from any negative inference. As a
result, there is a high risk that state evidence codes will be
amended-thereby affecting all privileges, including the attor-
ney-client privilege-to reflect the subsequent case law devel-
opments that have stripped the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation of its protection from negative inference in civil cases.
In fact, this process already has begun.
Two states, Maine and Louisiana, have reacted to the
more limited protection now given the privilege against self-
incrimination by amending their evidence codes to curtail pro-
tection for all privileges. Both states have enacted legislation
that allows a negative inference in civil cases, 88 but not in
... For example, the attorney-client privilege, when validly asserted, cannot be
overcome. The work-product privilege may be overcome, at least to the extent it
seeks work product, if there is substantial need and an inability to obtain equiva-
lent materials otherwise. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947).
188 ME. R. EvID. 513 (West 1994); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 503 (West 1995).
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criminal cases." 9 In doing so, both states have blindly trans-
posed the law governing inferences from claims of the fifth
amendment privilege to the attorney-client privilege and all
other privileges. As discussed earlier, the different underlying
policies of the privileges makes identical evidentiary treatment
inappropriate.9 '
The legislative actions of Maine and Louisiana eviscerate
the attorney-client privilege in the civil context without reason.
This legislation exemplifies the threat to the attorney-client
privilege unless its evidentiary consequences are separately
evaluated and severed from the fate of the fifth amendment
The claim of privilege by a party in a civil action or proceeding, whether in the
present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is a proper subject of comment by
judge or counsel. An appropriate inference may be drawn therefrom. Compare CAL.
EVID. CODE § 913 (West 1994).
' Maine Rule of Evidence 512 states:
Comment Upon or Inference from Claim of Privilege in Criminal Cases;
Instruction.
a) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of a privilege,
whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not
a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel in a criminal
case. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
b) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. In criminal
cases tried to a jury, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent
practicable, so as to facilitate the making or claims of privilege
without the knowledge of the jury.
c) Jury Instruction. Upon request, any accused in a criminal case
against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference from a
claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference
may be drawn therefrom.
Louisiana Code of Evidence article 503 states:
A. Comment, inference, and instructions.
(1) The claim of privilege, whether in the present proceeding or
upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge
or counsel. No inferences may by drawn therefrom.
(2) In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted . . . so as to facili-
tate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the
jury.
(3) Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an
adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruc-
tion that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
B. Exception in non-criminal proceedings. In noncriminal proceedings,
under exceptional circumstances in the interest of justice, if a claim of
privilege is sustained counsel may comment thereon, and, upon request,
the court shall instruct the trier of fact that it may draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom.
See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 913.
" See supra text accompanying notes 81-90.
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privilege. The evidentiary consequences of the attorney-client
privilege, like the scope of the privilege, must grow out of its
own theoretical foundations and serve its own policies, not
those of a different privilege.
To determine whether a negative inference is appropriate
requires careful and thorough consideration of its impact upon
the policies of the attorney-client privilege. Unless courts and
legislatures consider these effects, the evidentiary consequenc-
es may undermine the privilege entirely. Without a separate
analysis distinct from that of the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the protection given the attorney-client privilege will
continue to diminish as has the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, regardless of whether the policies of the attorney-client
privilege are impeded.
V. UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN INFER-
ENCE AND A CLAIM OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Before determining whether a negative inference is consis-
tent with the policies justifying the attorney-client privilege, it
is useful to know what the phrase "negative inference" means.
The case law permitting negative inferences typically is vague
about what is being permitted when allowing a negative infer-
ence upon a claim of attorney-client privilege. Ordinarily, an
inference is a reasonable deduction the fact-finder draws from
proven or absent facts.19' An inference can arise from evi-
" Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rwy. v. Hicks, 165 P.2d 167, 171 (Ariz. 1946);
Braycovich v. Braycovich, 314 P.2d 767, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Corcoran v.
Teamsters & Chauffeurs, Joint Council No. 32, 297 N.W. 4, 7 (Minn. 1941). For
examples of cases discussing an inference arising from proof of fact, see Interlake
Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1942) (NLRB's inference that laid
off employees were refused rehire because of their union membership and activities
was supported by substantial evidence); Waldman v. Shipyard Marina, 230 A.2d
841, 845-46 (R.I. 1967) (action for negligence to recover damages to boat from fire
occurring while the boat was docked at a marina). Proof of a relevant state of
mind can only be proved by inference arising from proved facts. See, e.g., Ameri-
can Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), in which the court ob-
served:
the state of a man's mind must be inferred from things he says or does.
Of course we agree that courts cannot "ascertain the thought that has
had no outward manifestation." But courts and juries everyday pass upon
knowledge, belief and intent-the state of men's minds-having before
them no more than evidence of their words and conduct, from which, in
ordinary human experience, mental condition may be inferred.
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dence that is circumstantial of the fact to be deduced,192 but
it is more than surmise, possibility or conjecture. 93 An infer-
ence is a permissible, not mandatory, conclusion.'
An inference is a logical deduction, not unlike the type of
factual leap or conclusion that ordinary and reasonable people
frequently draw from available information. The classic exam-
ple of an inference is where someone observes ten people walk-
ing outdoors and carrying umbrellas. Although rain is unseen,
it is logical for a person seeing others carrying open umbrellas
to infer on the basis of her observation and experience that it
is raining. Such an ordinary observation, however, cannot as a
matter of common experience support an inference of a con-
spiracy among those persons who are observed carrying um-
brellas. Such a factual leap or conclusion would be unreason-
able in the absence of more facts.
Similarly, to observe ten persons without umbrellas allows
an inference that it is not raining. An inference that something
does not exist is a negative inference. That is, the observation
of empty-handed pedestrians offers no evidence of rain and
allows one logically to draw a negative inference that there is
no rain from the absence of proof. This inference is a reasoned
deduction from the observed fact of the absence of umbrellas
combined with reason, logic and experience.' 9' Only reasoned
inferences, from proven facts or their absence, based on com-
mon experience, are permissible.9 ' Frequently when courts
use the terms "negative inference" or "adverse inference," they
do not mean to suggest that there is an absence of information.
Rather, the phrase is used to denote an inference that is ad-
verse or damaging to the legal position of the party against
Id. at 411.
"' Scott v. Burke, 247 P.2d 313, 319 (Cal. 1952).
" In re Woehrs Estate, 332 P.2d 818, 826 (Cal. 1958); Braycovich, 314 P.2d at
771.
"4 Sowers v. Marley, 70 S.E.2d 670, 672 (N.C. 1952).
"' Again, the observation that no pedestrians are carrying umbrellas does not
reasonably support an inference of a conspiracy to explain the parallel behavior of
10 people not carrying umbrellas, unless there is more information. Such an infer-
ence is ordinarily unreasonable and simply would not be supported as a matter of
logic and common experience. Consequently, a fact-finder should not be allowed to
draw that inference.
" Joel S. Hjelmaas, Stepping Back from the Thicket: A Proposal for the Treat-




whom it is permitted. In this respect, the evidentiary signifi-
cance of an adverse or negative inference is much more vague
and less anchored in reason, logic and experience.
When the negative inference is triggered by a claim of
attorney-client privilege rather than by proof of fact or the
absence of proof of fact, the question raised is why should this
non-evidentiary event, this procedural response, give rise to
any evidentiary consequence at all? Assuming there is to be an
inference, what should be the scope of the permissible infer-
ence? In this context, is it reasonable, logical or a matter of
common experience to conclude that information unfavorable to
the privilege holder has been withheld? Or is the inference
that unfavorable information has been withheld on account of
attorney-client privilege one of conjecture and speculation that
should not be permitted?
The attorney-client privilege shields favorable, damning,
and even irrelevant information. In this way, it differs dramat-
ically from the fifth amendment privilege, which exists only if
the shielded information is unfavorable and would damage the
criminal legal position of the privilege holder. Thus, as a mat-
ter of logic, one can infer that unfavorable information has
been withheld upon a claim of the fifth amendment privilege.
But no parallel logical deduction arises upon a claim of attor-
ney-client privilege. Since the attorney-client privilege operates
to shield more than unfavorable information, it is not logical to
infer that unfavorable information has been withheld when the
attorney-client privilege is claimed.197 This is particularly
true because there are reasons to assert the privilege in re-
sponse to a demand for disclosure, even where the communica-
tion contains favorable information to the client.
In addition, inferences ought to arise only from proof of
fact. The assertion of a claim of privilege, however, is a proce-
" One commentator, who urges that the privilege against self-incrimination
should give rise to a negative inference, also agrees that refusal to respond to
questioning on the ground of attorney-client privilege does not imply anything
about the content of the withheld response. The latter suggests only that the in-
formation was revealed under certain circumstances by the client. In contrast, a
refusal to respond on the ground that the response might incriminate oneself con-
notes something about the content of the response-that there is damaging infor-
mation-so that depending on the question and surrounding circumstances, claim
of this privilege may tend to prove relevant facts in the civil case. Heidt, supra
note 13, at 1117.
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dural event, not a proof of fact. It either says nothing about
the facts in dispute or suggests rather weakly that some infor-
mation may be withheld. It is not reasonable to infer that the
withheld information is unfavorable. The attorney-client privi-
lege claim reveals only that information was communicated to
a legal advisor. The fact that communication occurred does not
tell us whether the communication consisted of favorable, unfa-
vorable or irrelevant information. A claim of the attorney-client
privilege reveals little, if any, relevant information.
Silence sometimes may constitute an admission in the law
of evidence. The rule of evidence that "[flailure to contest an
assertion... is considered evidence of acquiescence," however,
only applies if "it would have been natural under the circum-
stances to object to the assertion in question."9 ' Applying the
doctrine of silence as an admission is inappropriate in a claim
of the attorney-client privilege. In asserting the attorney-client
privilege, often the party is not failing to contest an assertion
of fact but merely wishes to keep communications confidential.
In addition, it is not "natural" to answer a question about
confidential communications to one's legal advisor in a situa-
tion where normally the confidentiality is preserved forever at
the client's option. Thus, the "silence" arising from assertion of
the attorney-client privilege does not suggest the lack of any
available favorable response.
Assertion of the attorney-client privilege signals that the
privilege holder will not disclose confidential communications
with her lawyer. A privilege claim does not indicate that the
privilege holder will not respond to questions or assertions of
fact involving the underlying facts in the dispute. An inference
based on the rule of silence constituting acquiescence should
arise only when a party refuses to respond to a question call-
ing for underlying facts, not for a refusal to disclose confiden-
tial communications to a lawyer.
Similarly, the missing-witness doctrine is an inappropriate
analogy for a claim of attorney-client privilege. 99 The miss-
"" United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975); see also 3A WIGMORE, su-
pra note 2, § 1042, at 1056 ("A failure to assert a fact, when it would have been
natural to assert it, amounts in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the
fact.").
"' The withheld-evidence doctrine also is an inappropriate analogy. Withheld
evidence can consist of tangible evidence, documentary evidence or testimonial
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ing-witness doctrine allows an inference that unfavorable infor-
mation has been withheld when a party inexplicably fails to
supply evidence within her control. Because a number of valid
reasons exist for why a party may choose to withhold attorney-
client communications, it is unreliable to infer that refusal to
waive the privilege is based solely on the claimant's belief that
the communications contain unfavorable information. Waiver
presents many pitfalls and a response to a particular question
may result in a waiver of the privilege for information well
beyond that sought by the particular question. Additionally,
the information contained in the communications may be cu-
mulative of already admitted favorable proof on the issue,
thereby giving the privilege holder even less incentive to risk
waiver as to other aspects of the communications. Finally,
some privilege-holders may refuse to waive the privilege be-
cause they value their privacy and invoking the privilege al-
lows them to maintain that privacy.
In addition, the missing-witness doctrine presupposes that
a-party has some duty to respond or to refute or offer proof in
support of a claim or defense. In such circumstances, it is "nat-
ural to speak" to the issue at hand and, therefore, it is logical
to assume that the reason people choose silence is that they
have nothing favorable to offer in response. But sometimes the
privilege holder will bear no burden of proof on the issue to
which the privileged communication relates and, therefore, it is
not natural to speak. This reasoning also is inapplicable where
a privilege is asserted since, if a privilege means anything, it
eliminates, ipso facto, any duty to speak or adduce the infor-
mation. It is not natural, therefore, to produce the privileged
information, particularly where it is cumulative of evidence
already contained in the record. Since the privilege bars disclo-
sure, the fact-finder never learns whether the privileged com-
munication actually contains cumulative information, yet a
negative inference assumes the withheld information is not
cumulative. Such an assumption is unwarranted because it is
speculative.
evidence. An unexplained failure or refusal to adduce evidence sought, where it
would be natural to offer it to rebut contrary evidence, logically may suggest that
the evidence is unhelpful or even damaging to the withholding party's legal posi-
tion.
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Another problem with allowing a negative inference is that
frequently the question for which the privilege is asserted is
too vague to elicit the substantive content of the undisclosed
information. Thus, any inference from a claim of privilege may
be ambiguous."' For example, in an antitrust price-fixing
conspiracy case, a defendant may be asked in pretrial discov-
ery to produce all documents related to pricing policy. If some
documents are withheld on account of the attorney-client privi-
lege, it is difficult to infer reasonably that the withheld docu-
ments contain evidence of an agreement to fix prices. The
discovery question is so broad it cannot fairly support the in-
ference that the information was withheld because it was unfa-
vorable.0 ' To allow a negative inference upon the claim of
privilege in response to this type of question is to allow conjec-
ture, pure and simple.2
The procedural event of a claim of attorney-client privilege
should not be considered an event of evidentiary significance.
The attorney-client privilege exists to deny disclosure of the
communications between client and lawyer from the fact-find-
er. In other words, the purpose of the attorney-client privilege
is to foreclose evidence in response to questions about a client's
and lawyer's communications. In this respect, the attorney-
client privilege differs from the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination. The policy behind the privilege against self-
211 See MCCOMCIcK ON EVIDENCE § 270 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
... Of course, there will be some questions that are not overly vague and a
claim of privilege may reveal the specific content of the non-disclosed information.
Suppose a defendant on trial for murder takes the stand and, without assistance
from his lawyer, tells the jury he thought he saw a gun in the victim's hand.
Accordingly, his defense was one of self-defense. On cross-examination, the prosecu-
tor might try to prove that this statement is inconsistent with prior versions of
the events recounted by the defendant. The prosecutor might ask questions such
as: "Before testifying here today, you didn't tell anyone that the victim had a gun,
did you?" or "You didn't tell your lawyer that the victim had a gun, did you?" A
claim of attorney-client privilege may be appropriate in response to these ques-
tions. These questions are sufficiently specific to inform the fact-finder that the
information withheld is either that the defendant did or did not tell this fact to
his lawyer. To this narrow question accusing the defendant of fabrication, the con-
tent of the withheld information is narrowed down to one of two choices. A nega-
tive inference, therefore, logically would follow.
202 In addition, to change the valid non-response of a claim of attorney-client
privilege into something akin to proof of unfavorable information to the privilege
holder strays afar from the goal of the American adversarial process-to ascertain
truth by competent proof of relevant facts, not innuendo.
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incrimination is to forbid compulsion, not to limit access to
information from the accused. In fact, the criminal justice
system welcomes information stemming from self-incrimination
and often rewards it in the form of more lenient sentences and
plea bargains for those who plead guilty or are willing to in-
criminate themselves. Shielding this damaging information
from disclosure is not the policy of the fifth amendment privi-
lege. The policy is to forbid compulsion, not the revelation of
self-incriminating evidence itself."3
Allowing an adverse inference to arise from a claim of the
attorney-client privilege also is problematic because the attor-
ney-client privilege claim suggests no logical connection with
the existence of any fact in dispute. A claimant asserts the
attorney-client privilege to protect confidential communications
from disclosure, regardless of their content. Since an inference
is said to arise from certain proof of facts,"4 it is difficult to
understand how an inference can arise when the attorney-
client privilege is claimed." 5 No facts are established or sug-
gested by such a claim. A client's or lawyer's refusal to answer
a question seeking disclosure of privileged communication
contains no factual response. If an inference arises, it is erect-
ed without foundation since the facts protected by the privilege
may be either good, bad or indifferent to the legal position of
the privilege-holder.
The privilege's rationale of protecting disclosures made to
an attorney on the premise of absolute confidentiality does not
2"3 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1988); People v. Anderson, 46 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5-7 (Ct. App.
1965).
204 State v. Corby, 145 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1958), overruled on other grounds, State
v. Taylor, 217 A.2d 1 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1966). The court in Corby
distinguished presumptions from inferences thus:
[A] presumption is an assumption of fact . . . which requires such fact to
be assumed from another fact or set of facts. An inference is a deduction
which may or may not be made from certain proven facts.... A pre-
sumption ... prima facie establishes the fact to be true; it remains
compulsory if it is not disproved. A presumption cannot be disregarded
by the jury while an inference may or may not be .... (With an) infer-
ence . . . [tihe jury is at liberty to find the ultimate fact one way or the
other as they may be convinced by the testimony.... Mhe jury may
draw the conclusion, depending upon how they view the impact of the
proof..., [Ain inference is a permissive deduction which the reason of
the jury may or may not reach without express direction of the law.
Id. at 293.
20 Id.
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suggest a greater likelihood that what was revealed was infor-
mation unfavorable to the speaker. Indeed, one must invoke
the attorney-client privilege simply to prevent the waiver of all
confidential conversations between lawyer and client on an
issue. A waiver, resulting in opening the door to reveal still
more communications, could lead directly to confusion of the
issues.
Allowing an adverse inference to arise from claims of at-
torney-client privilege presents other logical problems. Typi-
cally, no party to a lawsuit waives the attorney-client privilege.
In such a case, is it permissible to allow the jury to draw an
adverse inference against either or both parties for failing to
waive the privilege and reveal privileged discussions? No one
has suggested this and for good reason. Such an inference
would be conjectural, not reasoned. The inference is inappro-
priate because it lacks roots in the proof properly admitted in
the trial record and allows the fact-finder to act irrationally in
holding a failure to waive the privilege against a party.
If a permissible negative inference is nonsensical where
neither party waives the privilege, it also follows that an infer-
ence should not be permitted where only one party is asked to
waive the privilege and refuses. Because although only one
party has been subjected to questioning in which he expressly
refused to waive the privilege, in fact, the other party also
failed to waive the privilege. Since in this case neither party
waives the privilege, it is illogical to allow an adverse inference
against only one party who expressly asserts it during ques-
tioning. The conduct of expressly refusing to waive is not sub-
stantially different from passive non-waiver of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. In both instances, neither party "told all."
As a practical matter, there is still another problem with
allowing an adverse inference upon a claim of attorney-client
privilege. Lawyers may seize this line of questioning to gain a
tactical advantage. If a client must allow his lawyer to testify
to attorney-client communications or face an adverse inference,
the client may yield the privilege. The result is that client's
lawyer then becomes a witness, not just an advocate. As a
witness, the lawyer's credibility can be impeached. Such a
situation can seriously impede the lawyer's effectiveness as an
advocate. The lawyer also risks disqualification under the
ethical rules prohibiting the lawyer from acting as a witness in
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his own case.20 6 Inviting such a motion also burdens courts'
scarce resources. Thus, to permit counsel to seek attorney-
client communications under threat of adverse inference leaves
a party exposed to the risk of being subjected to unfair tactics
that result in the disqualification of his lawyer, the weakening
of the effectiveness of representation, or being exposed to the
difficulties and costs of obtaining new counsel. Turning the
lawyer into a witness or threatening an adverse inference if
the communication is withheld also threatens the right to
choose one's own counsel"7  and the right to effective
assistance.0 8
A claim of privilege is no substitute for proof. An assertion
of the attorney-client privilege is not akin to sworn testimony,
competent documentary proof, physical evidence or silence in
the face of evidence. A negative inference is a shadow, devoid
of substance in this context and cannot as a logical, reasonable
proposition be inferred." 9 To allow a jury to speculate as to
the facts shielded by a claim of attorney-client privilege and
then to infer that the speculative deduction involves informa-
tion unfavorable to the privilege holder is, as described by
Abraham Lincoln, akin to the soup "'made by boiling the shad-
ow of a pigeon that had starved to death."210 Jurors should
not be allowed to dine upon such insubstantial fare.
Since an inference is a deduction that should arise from
the reasoning of the jury,2" it should not be allowed from a
20 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.9, 3.7 (1993).
207 The right to choose one's own counsel may have been resolved by Morris v.
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983). In Morris, the Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment did not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between attorney and client.
Id. at 13.
20 Effective assistance of counsel is a conscientious, meaningful representation
wherein the accused is advised of his rights and an honest, learned and able
counsel is given a reasonable opportunity to perform the assigned task. State v.
Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 1984). The benchmark for judging a claim of
ineffectiveness of counsel is whether counsers conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
20 Interlake Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1942).
210 Id.
. Some scholars contrast the fifth amendment privilege with the attorney-client
privilege, arguing that the former, but not the latter, has some logical bearing on
the underlying facts in dispute. See generally Heidt, supra note 13, at 1117. In
other words, a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination is logically connect-
ed to a material fact in dispute and logically can support an inference against the
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claim of attorney-client privilege. Mere suspicion connects the
claim of privilege to an inference of damaging information. The
path of reason does not lead to an adverse inference when
there are no facts from which to reason.
The probative value of an inference arising from a claim of
attorney-client privilege is slight at best. The prejudice to the
truth-seeking goal of the litigation process and to the privilege
holder, however, may be great. The danger exists that the
inference may be unjustified or vague, that the privilege
holder's lawyer may be reduced to a witness, impeding the
lawyer's ability to be effective in his role as advocate. A nega-
tive inference is so speculative that it may confuse the issues
of a case. On any balancing test, the advantage gained by
allowing a negative inference is far outweighed by the disad-
vantages.
An inference does not arise logically from a claim of attor-
ney-client privilege. If courts permit an inference, the eviden-
tiary consequence allowed should be defined as no more severe
than the casting of a shadow or illumination on the evidence
properly admitted into the trial record. In other words, if there
must be an inference, despite all its evidentiary problems, the
contours of an inference drawn from the attorney-client privi-
lege should amount only to an adverse gloss on properly admit-
ted proof. As discussed in the next section, even a minor infer-
ence acts to undermine the policies of the privilege. If courts
and legislatures permit a negative inference upon a claim of
attorney-client privilege, they must be alert to the detrimental
impact on the policies justifying the privilege.
VI. A NEGATIVE INFERENCE THWARTS THE PoLIcIEs OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Courts and legislatures should strive to implement a privi-
lege only if it is justified by a valid social purpose. Before at-
taching an evidentiary consequence to a claim of privilege,
claimant because the privilege would not exist except to shield some fact that
tends to suggest criminal misconduct. See REPORT TO ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra
note 14. There is no logical link, however, between the information protected by
the attorney-client privilege and the existence of unfavorable information to the
client. A failure to waive the privilege is not unexplained or unexplainable and
that act is also not logically connected to the existence of unfavorable information.
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courts and legislatures should evaluate the consequences to
determine whether they have substantially undercut the privi-
lege. Imposing an evidentiary consequence unintentionally may
become a backdoor for eliminating the privilege. Because the
policies supporting the attorney-client privilege remain an
important part of our adversary system, courts and legislatures
ought to be wary of doing anything that undercuts the privi-
lege. An adverse inference that curtails the protection of the
attorney-client privilege may thwart its effectiveness.
The preceeding sections have examined the numerous
beneficial policies underlying the attorney-client privilege.
These include encouraging full and frank communications
between attorneys and their clients; promoting consultation
with lawyers, resulting in greater conformity to the law; help-
ing attorneys to be more effective because they are better pre-
pared; facilitating greater accuracy in discovering facts leading
to the elimination of meritless lawsuits and ill-conceived de-
fenses, and the efficient settlement of claims; and generally
leading to a conservation of judicial resources and a more effi-
cient administration of justice. 1 The privilege against self-
incrimination, with its evidentiary rule allowing an adverse
inference in civil cases but not in criminal cases, also was con-
sidered above.
One might erroneously assume, as have the legislatures of
Maine and Louisiana,"' as well as some courts,214 that the
evidentiary consequence drawn from invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination is equally appropriate for the attor-
ney-client privilege. But an evidentiary consequence born of
the policies of the fifth amendment privilege may be an inap-
propriate model for the attorney-client privilege. As discussed
above, the goals of the attorney-client privilege are sufficiently
different from those of the Fifth Amendment that to transpose
the fifth amendment evidentiary rules on the attorney-client
privilege would be an error, compromising the effectiveness of
the attorney-client privilege. The fifth amendment privilege
protects a person against compulsion to incriminate himself in
any criminal case. In criminal cases the policy of the Fifth
212 See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
212 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
21 See supra text accompanying notes 106-33.
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Amendment prohibits compulsion, not self-incrimination or
disclosure of self-incriminating evidence. In civil cases, how-
ever, one has the legal obligation to speak truthfully despite
the adverse impact that would occur to one's civil liability, so
long as these admissions do not create criminal responsibility.
Perhaps intuitively it may seem that a privilege of statuto-
ry or common-law dimension-such as the attorney-client priv-
ilege-should not be granted a greater scope of insulation from
evidentiary consequences than a privilege born of constitution-
al dimension. One might reason, therefore, that if the fifth
amendment privilege cannot escape adverse inference in the
civil case, neither should the attorney-client privilege. But this
reasoning is wrong. Just as the Supreme Court, in fashioning
the appropriate scope of the evidentiary consequences of the
fifth amendment privilege, made reference to the policies of
that privilege,215 so must any rule concerning the evidentiary
consequences of a claim of the attorney-client privilege anchor
itself in the policies of that particular privilege.
There are several reasons why the attorney-client privilege
should escape adverse inference in civil cases even when the
fifth amendment privilege does not. First, the attorney-client
privilege differs from the fifth amendment privilege in that its
policies apply with equal force to civil and criminal cases alike.
The nature of the proceeding, therefore, does not provide any
basis for distinction in the appropriate evidentiary consequenc-
es. An adverse inference is as repugnant to the policies of the
attorney-client privilege in civil cases as in criminal. In con-
trast, the Fifth Amendment seeks only to avert compelled self-
incrimination to the detriment of one accused in the criminal
case.
An adverse inference upon claim of attorney-client privi-
lege would supply a client with three self-destructive choices:
(1) waive the privilege and contribute to one's demise because
he had disclosed everything-good and bad-to the lawyer; (2)
waive the privilege, having disclosed only favorable facts to the
lawyer which therefore contribute nothing adverse to the trial
evidence (but requires the client to suffer from an unprepared
legal advocate); or (3) assert the privilege and be destroyed by
... See Baxter v. Pahligiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-20 (1976); McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 213-17 (1971).
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innuendo from negative inference. This new cruel trilemma
hinders both the attorney-client privilege and the truth-seek-
ing mission of litigation.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege most often
identified by utilitarians is to encourage full and frank com-
munications between clients and legal advisors.216 Permitting
a negative inference would undermine this goal. If a negative
inference is permitted, lawyers consulting with clients will
have to advise them up front that the client could be asked to
waive the privilege and that failure to waive could result in
the fact-finder holding this against the client in resulting liti-
gation. If clients know that being frank, revealing both favor-
able and damaging information, could be used to their detri-
ment they are likely to shape what they tell the lawyer. Thus
the clients are likely to omit unfavorable information so that
they will be able to waive the privilege if asked because the
lawyer's testimony at trial will not harm their case. A rule
allowing a negative inference upon a privilege claim, coupled
with a lawyer's informing the client of this prospect, produces
a strong disincentive for the client to reveal unfavorable
information to the lawyer.
In addition, if clients are advised that they can be asked to
waive the privilege under the threat of adverse inference, this
creates an incentive for clients to provide favorable information
to the lawyer. The incentive may be so strong that it provides
a motive for fabricating or shading the facts. Clients may pro-
vide favorable information that is not wholly accurate so that
the lawyer can testify to this information if waiver is sought.
No stronger disincentive to full and frank communications
exists than such an inference.
Allowing a negative inference upon claim of privilege pres-
sures the client to waive the privilege. Although that may be
the underlying purpose of allowing a negative inference, it is
contrary to the policy behind this privilege protecting the confi-
dentiality of communications. It is questionable whether an
evidentiary consequence designed to compel disclosure can be
understood as consistent with the privilege's design. Since the
privilege promises absolute confidentiality, penalizing the
decision of the privilege holder to preserve the confidentiality
21 See supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
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of the communications is anomalous. It is inconsistent for the
law to penalize both the preservation of confidentiality and the
failure to preserve the confidentiality of the privilege. This
leaves the client with a choice between Scylla and
Charybdis-preserve the confidentially of the communication
and suffer an inference or waive confidentiality and lose the
privilege's protection on the subject. The client loses no matter
which route is chosen. The attorney-client privilege becomes a
weapon against, not a refuge for, clients.
A client who waives the privilege in response to one ques-
tion risks losing the privilege in respect to other questions. If
the client does not waive the privilege, however, she risks the
fact-finder being permitted to conclude that the privilege is
being invoked to conceal unfavorable information. This renders
the promise of protection for attorney-client communications
meaningless. If nullifying the privilege is the goal of the law, it
would be simpler, more direct and more honest to eliminate
the privilege outright. If privilege nullification is not the goal
of the law, however, then clients should not be penalized for
their decision to maintain confidentiality.
Another justification for the attorney-client privilege dis-
cussed above and as advanced by utilitarians is the lawyer's
role as effective advocate. Without full disclosure, utilitarians
argue, the lawyer cannot be properly prepared to defend or
promote the client's cause."' This will damage both the client
and the administration of justice. If the lawyer becomes a
witness, the lawyer will face impeachment and credibility
problems typical of any witness. Where a client is pressured to
waive the privilege to permit the lawyer to testify, the effec-
tiveness of the lawyer as an advocate is undermined before the
jury.2
18
In addition, where an adverse inference threatens a client
who refuses to waive the privilege, lawyers will be loathe to
seek more information than that volunteered by the client.
27 See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
211 If the client can be pressured into waiving the privilege to permit the law-
yer to testify, an adversary may use this stratagem to turn the legal advocate into
a witness and thereby force the lawyer's withdrawal from representation of the cli-
ent. This not only would unnecessarily deny a client his choice of lawyer, but
would increase the client's legal costs in the litigation and undermine the right to
counsel in criminal cases.
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Lawyers know that to prepare themselves to give advice about
a transaction or for litigation requires prying a great deal of
information from the client in addition to that volunteered.
Lawyers will not be anxious to pursue unfavorable information
from a client if they know there is a risk that they will be
required either to disclose that information to their clients'
ultimate detriment or have them suffer an adverse inference.
Ultimately, both the disincentive to the client to be frank
and the disincentive to the lawyer to obtain further informa-
tion from the client are created by threat of negative inference.
This inexorably must result in lawyers learning less informa-
tion from their client, and being less effective advocates. No
longer will the attorney-client privilege help to develop well-
prepared lawyers who will effectively defend or promote the
causes of their client.
The threat of a negative inference necessarily will lead to
a tremendous waste of court time. Courts, already overbur-
dened with crowded dockets, will endure many more weak
claims, weak defenses and poorly prepared cases. Cases that
should be settled will end up in trial because of the lawyer's
loss of information from the client. Trial strategy, resting on
incomplete information, more frequently will prove futile, mis-
leading and inadequate. As such, another goal of the attorney-
client privilege will be sacrificed: promotion of the efficient
administration of justice.
The negative inference would compromise yet another goal
of the attorney-client privilege, that of achieving justice. "[The
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is inextricably linked to
the very integrity and accuracy of the fact finding process it-
self."219 Yet an evidentiary consequence that serves to under-
mine a client's incentive to disclose and an attorney's willing-
ness to seek information necessarily must have an adverse
effect upon the facts developed before and during trial. This
compromise further harms the integrity and accuracy of the
fact-finding process.
In addition to the goals recognized by utilitarians, other
justifications advanced by full utilitarians and non-utilitarians
will be compromised. For example, the goal of encouraging
more people to consult with lawyers, which fosters greater
219 United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978).
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conformity of conduct to law, will suffer because a negative
inference will not only be a disincentive to full disclosure, but
also may dissuade people from seeking a lawyer's advice in the
first place. Since one cannot disclose the problematic issues or
facts to the lawyer without risk of legal liability, there is less
reason for a prospective client to undergo the expense and
trouble of consulting the lawyer for advice. Even when a
lawyer's advice is sought, the lawyer will know less than the
client and the client will be less likely to trust and follow the
lawyer's advice.
An adverse inference impedes another purpose of the privi-
lege espoused by non-utilitarian supporters of the privileges:
the goal of privacy. To allow an adverse inference to arise from
a person's claim of attorney-client privilege stigmatizes her for
keeping confidential that which she is entitled to keep private
by law. Privacy is cherished as a value of our society. It seems
cruel to cast a shadow on those who value their privacy and
who, within the ambit of the law, rightfully seek to maintain
it.
Because an adverse inference provides a disincentive to
seeking a lawyer's advice before one embarks on a course of
action, another goal of the attorney-client privilege advanced
by full-utilitarian theorists will be sacrificed: the goal of indi-
viduals' maximizing their autonomy within the confines of a
system of laws. To be sure, individuals will continue to seek to
maximize their autonomy. Individuals will do so, however,
without legal guidance about how to achieve their goals in a
lawful manner. Seeking to achieve their goals without the
advice of lawyers, they will end up more frequently outside of
the law's parameters.
Not only does a negative inference substantially impede
many important goals of the privilege, but the goals are sacri-
ficed for little reward. On any balancing test, what society
loses from allowing an adverse reference far exceeds what is
presumed to be gained.
Allowing a negative inference fails to achieve greater accu-
racy in the truth-seeking contest of litigation. More is lost than
simply the information confided to the lawyer. Inaccuracy in
fact-finding is more likely because an adverse inference from a
claim of attorney-client privilege is by its nature speculative. It
is not a reasoned and logical deduction springing from fact.
1995] 1413
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
Such speculation is hardly the bulwark of accuracy. Unfortu-
nately, allowing an adverse inference to arise from a claim of
attorney-client privilege may result in more instances of injus-
tice by contributing to greater inaccuracy in the truth-seeking
process and creating prejudice against the claimant.
In addition, the attorney-client privilege does not deprive a
fact-finder of any information that would exist absent the priv-
ilege." Similarly, to forbid a negative inference does not de-
prive the fact-finder of any information. The evidence as to the
underlying events in dispute-in the form of sworn testimony,
documents and tangible evidence-exists and is available inde-
pendent of communications between lawyer and client. A nega-
tive inference does not multiply the accessible facts and the
claim of privilege does not deny access to the underlying facts.
A negative inference also reveals next to nothing about any
claimant's credibility.
Thus, the total sum of information available to the fact-
finder will not increase from a rule providing disincentive for
communications between lawyer and client. Threat of adverse
inference may impel more clients to waive the privilege and
testify, or permit their lawyers to testify, about their confiden-
tial communications. But to avoid disclosure at trial of commu-
nications disclosing information of an unfavorable nature,
clients will cease making full disclosure when they consult
their lawyers and lawyers will cease insisting on frank discus-
sion. Since a threat of negative inference creates less informa-
tion between lawyer and client (eliminating unfavorable disclo-
sure), waiver of the privilege will not add to the fact-finder's
store of knowledge. Instead, it will contribute to a loss of infor-
mation.
Another serious problem with allowing an adverse infer-
ence is that it may transform one's attorney from protector to
destroyer, completely undermining the privilege and the attor-
ney-client relationship in the process. Consider the following
hypothetical. A defendant is on trial for murder and the cir-
cumstantial evidence is not overwhelming. The state has
proved no motive. The prosecutor calls the defendant's lawyer
and asks whether she showed the defendant a police report
" See Saltzburg, supra note 47, at 610; see also supra text accompanying notes
58-59.
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indicating the murder victim was a government informant. 221
This question goes to motive. Any response is barred by the
protection of the attorney-client privilege. If the client does not
waive the privilege, the jury will not learn the answer. But if a
negative inference is allowed from a failure to waive the privi-
lege, the position of the client is undermined. The jury can now
speculate on a motive, supplied only by invocation of the claim
of privilege. This turns the attorney-client relationship upside
down. Such a result is irreconcilable with the very existence of
the privilege. To protect the policies of the attorney-client priv-
ilege when the privilege holder is a party, no adverse inference
should be permitted.' To allow the inference is to exact a
penalty for the exercise of the privilege.'
Since a negative inference is inconsistent with the policies
of the privilege, neither counsel nor the court should be per-
mitted to comment on a claim of attorney-client privilege to the
jury. There would be no valid reason to comment if the act of
claiming the privilege is bereft of evidentiary significance. It
would be improper to draw the fact-finder's attention to a mat-
ter irrelevant to the task of finding the facts. In addition, since
a claim of privilege is extraneous to the underlying disputed
facts, a party's claim of privilege ought to occur without the
knowledge of the jury. 4 In civil cases where extensive pretri-
al discovery is the norm, a claim of privilege at trial can be
anticipated. In those circumstances, a procedure for avoiding
"' The hypothetical is drawn from the facts of In re Navarro, 155 Cal. Rptr.
522 (Ct. App. 1979).
22 This is the approach taken by proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513(a). See
supra note 180. A number of state jurisdictions have adopted this rule. See supra
note 179. The Proposed Federal Rule was not enacted by Congress to prevent
freezing the law of privilege. See Advisory Comm. Notes to FED. R. EVID. 501.
This decision showed foresight on the part of Congress. Reliance on the Proposed
Federal Rule of Evidence 513(a) is inadequate support for prohibiting a negative
inference from the claim of attorney-client privilege because that rule relied on the
draftsmen's outdated, expansive interpretation of a 1965 case involving assertion of
the fifth amendment privilege by a defendant in a criminal proceeding. See Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616 (1965). The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
constitutionality of a negative inference arising from a claim of the privilege
against self-incrimination in a civil case subsequently found the inference to be
consistent with the Fifth Amendments goals and, hence, permissible.
22 See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613-15 (discussing the permissibility of an adverse
inference in civil cases from claim of fifth amendment privilege).
22 This is the approach taken by Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513(b) and
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See supra note 180.
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claims of privilege occurring in front of the jury can be fash-
ioned.
In criminal cases where there is little pretrial discovery, it
will not always be possible to anticipate a claim of privilege.
Prosecutors should not be permitted, however, to ask questions
where the response obviously seeks privileged attorney-client
information, unless the prosecutor has obtained a ruling in
advance from the court either that no valid attorney-client
privilege exists, perhaps because of the crime/fraud exception,
or that the privilege has been waived.
Furthermore, it should be incumbent upon the criminal
defense lawyer to raise foreseeable attorney-client privilege
claims by defense witnesses with the court in advance in a
motion in limine. Where the claim cannot be anticipated, a
procedure-such as making a non-speaking objection, i.e., with-
out identifying the claim of privilege-can avoid invocation of
the privilege in front of the jury, while permitting the cross-
examination to continue. Such precautions, coupled with a jury
instruction cautioning the jury not to guess at the answers to
questions where an objection has been sustained, should pro-
tect a party who, in the rare, unforeseeable case, must claim
the privilege before the fact-finder.
Despite these precautions, sometimes it may be impossible
to avoid an assertion of the attorney-client privilege in front of
the jury. In such cases, the aggrieved party may wish to have
the jury instructed that all parties enjoy protection of the at-
torney-client privilege and that no inference should be drawn
from any party's claim of the privilege.' A party who per-
ceives its interest as damaged by its assertion of the privilege
should be entitled to such an instruction as a matter of
right.226 That party, as part of its trial strategy also may
wish to avoid drawing attention to the claim of privilege and
therefore may wish to forego any such jury instruction. The
election should be made by the party who claimed the privi-
lege.
Where a non-party asserts a claim of attorney-client privi-
lege, a negative inference does not make the assertion of the
2 See SUPREME COURT STANDARD 513(c).
" See Advisory Committee Notes to proposed SUPREME COURT STANDARD
513(c), supra note 180 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
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privilege costly to the privilege holder. A negative inference
arising out of a non-party's invocation costs the non-party
privilege holder nothing since a non-party has nothing at stake
in the lawsuit. Therefore, because a negative inference does
not pressure a non-party privilege holder, it does not result in
a likelihood of waiver and has not served the supposed purpose
of making the information sought more available. In addition,
since no one can anticipate whether he will be asked to waive
the privilege as a non-party or as a party, to allow a negative
inference when non-parties claim the privilege results in the
same chill on communications between lawyer and client. To
permit a negative inference on claims by non-parties thwarts
the policies of the attorney-client privilege as discussed above.
It is not logical to assume that the non-party witness' claim of
privilege reflects the existence of information unfavorable to
the party who called the non-party to testify, making a nega-
tive inference still less appropriate.
Perhaps one exception is required to a rule forbidding
negative inference and requiring invocation of the attorney-
client privilege outside a jury's presence. The exceptional case
might involve an accomplice witness for the prosecution in a
criminal case. In cases where the prosecution calls a witness,
by definition a non-party witness, that witness may refuse on
direct or cross-examination to respond to a question that calls
for privileged attorney-client communication. In such a case,
the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause may be implicated where a jury is not permitted to
learn that a prosecution witness had claimed the attorney-
client privilege in response to specific questions.227
It is not that the claim of privilege in this context logically
gives rise to a reasoned deduction that provides "gloss on the
evidence." Rather, a fact-finder's knowledge that a witness in a
criminal case has invoked the privilege may contribute to a
jury's finding that reasonable doubt exists or that the prosecu-
tion failed to adduce sufficient evidence to meet its high bur-
den of proof. A jury also may be reluctant to rely on the credi-
bility of a non-party witness in a criminal case where that
witness invokes the attorney-client privilege. In this instance,
courts may require the flexibility of a rule allowing the jury to
22 Commonwealth v. Sims, 521 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. 1987).
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learn of and consider the witness's claim of privilege in order
to preserve a defendant's confrontation clause guarantees, the
right to have the prosecution satisfy its strict burden of proof,
or to serve the interests of justice.
Courts need the flexibility of a rule that would allow the
claim of privilege to occur in front of the jury in a criminal case
involving invocation of the privilege by a non-party witness for
the prosecution. The inflexibility of proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 513 and of the state legislation following its
path-forbidding adverse inference in all instances-may seri-
ously impinge upon the exercise of defendant's confrontation
clause rights and the interests of justice. Any rule prohibiting
adverse inference upon claim of attorney-client privilege in
some circumstances may have to be balanced against a crimi-
nal defendant's rights, to best serve the interests of justice.
What is needed is a rule of evidence that balances the desir-
ability of maximizing the effectiveness of the policies underly-
ing the attorney-client privilege yet protects a criminal
defendant's constitutional rights and the interests of justice.
To achieve this end, I propose the following as a new rule
of evidence:
Comment Upon, Inference from, Jury Instruction about, Claim
of Attorney-Client Privilege.
(a) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), a claim of at-
torney-client privilege, in civil and criminal cases, whether in
the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, shall give rise
to no inference and shall not be a proper subject for comment
by court or counsel.
(b) In criminal proceedings, where a court first finds that
the interests of justice require, a claim of attorney-client privi-
lege by a non-party witness may occur in the presence of the
jury, may be commented upon by defense counsel and, upon
request by the defense, the court may instruct the jury that it
may draw all reasonable inferences therefrom as to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence and the credibility of the witness.
(c) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), in jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted to the extent practicable, so as
to facilitate the making of claims of attorney-client privilege
without the knowledge of the jury.
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(d) Except as provided in subparagraph (b), upon request,
any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse infer-
ence from a claim of attorney-client privilege is entitled to an
instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
CONCLUSION
A negative inference upon a claim of attorney-client privi-
lege should be disallowed because it is speculative and because
any possible probative value is outweighed by prejudice and
confusion of issues. Further, the penalty of a negative infer-
ence substantially undermines goals of the attorney-client
privilege by encouraging less than full and frank attorney-cli-
ent communications and less frequent consultations with legal
advisors. This will lead to lawyers having less information and
being less-effective legal advisors, weaker cases being brought
and, inevitably, a tremendous waste of valuable court time. It
also may lead to more frequent transgressions of the law and
consequently to greater injury to the public. Allowing an infer-
ence provides an incentive to seek attorney-client privileged
communications for unfair tactical reasons. These tactics may
be designed to turn the lawyer into a witness. This strategy
can undermine the lawyer's effectiveness as an advocate or
result in her disqualification which in turn interrupts the liti-
gation process and adds considerable expense. It is irrelevant
whether the privilege claim is made in a civil or criminal case,
since the goals of the attorney-client privilege apply equally to
each. In neither case should a negative inference be allowed.
One exception, however, should be rejected. Because protecting
a criminal defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is
paramount, at times the interests of justice may require that a
fact-finder be allowed to consider a claim of privilege made by
a prosecution witness.
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